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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Hegel’s critique of abstract labor in the Philosophy of Right and the 
sections on objective spirit in the Encyclopaedia. Against both Frederick Neuhouser’s and 
Marxist interpretations, I argue that abstract labor, for Hegel, characterizes the specific kind of 
mechanical labor undertaken in the nineteenth-century factory. Such repetitive labor, Hegel 
claims, leads to the deadening (Abstumpfung) of the worker through the deforming of her ethical 
subjectivity, a social pathology he hopes will be resolved by machine automation. By developing 
two key aspects of Hegel’s social theory—that labor produces ethical subjectivity or education 
(Bildung) and that this education is the central locus of civil society’s ethicality—I argue that we 
ought to understand Hegel’s hope for machine automation as a critique of those forms of labor 
which prevent the worker’s rational participation in the totality of the labor process and thus fail 
to actualize her social freedom.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 In this thesis, I seek to critically examine the answers that we find in G. W. F. Hegel’s 
(1770–1831) mature political writings—the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Elements of 
Philosophy of Right), first published in 1820,1 and the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline), first 
published in 1817 with second and third editions appearing in 1827 and 1830, respectively—to a 
broad set of questions regarding the role of labor in modern societies: why must we, as citizens 
of a modern state, secure ourselves a line of work in order to live a properly ethical life? What 
kind of subject is enculturated, formed, and educated by and for this required labor? And what 
kinds of labor processes and labor-related institutions count as successfully establishing ethical 
subject-formation? While Hegel is usually taken to hold a commonplace or even conservative 
view of labor and its institutional arrangement, affirming, critics say, the strict Protestant work 
ethic found in Kant and analyzed by Weber, my contention is that this interpretation of Hegel is 
fundamentally challenged by a close reading of his critique of abstract labor and his endorsement 
of machine automation as the immanent solution to the rising tide of the unskilled and repetitive 
labor nascent within his industrializing nineteenth-century European milieu.  
 While Hegel’s critique of abstract labor illuminates many of the compelling aspects of his 
theory of labor, such as its disruption of any straightforward distinction between the political and 
the economic aspects of modern society, its careful interweaving of the interest of the individual 
with those of a more universal bent, and its insistence on the irreducibility of substantial norms 
in any ethical evaluation of the labor process (and is thus a worthy object of inquiry for Hegel 
                                                 
1 While the published edition was dated 1821 (PR xlvii), the Philosophy of Right was in fact published in 
1820 (PR xxxv). Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. 
Knox and Stephen Houlgate (Oxford University Press, 2008), x.  
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scholarship in its own right), the set of immediate political concerns it addresses is also very 
much our own. Today, the ethical status of labor is in crisis. The most industrialized economies 
are now facing a new wave of automation in spheres usually understood to be immune to it, such 
as the service, retail, and transportation industries. This has led many political theorists to seek 
out alternative ways of distributing not just the fruits of productive labor conceived as the result 
of social cooperation but also labor itself, generating a revitalized interest in policy proposals 
such as universal basic income,2 the reduction of the working week, mandated automation,3 
publically guaranteed jobs,4 state-funded job training,5 and so on—all of which directly 
challenge the primacy and independence of labor in the formation of ethical subjectivity. 
Universal basic income and other calls for further automation even question the very necessity of 
labor for ethical subject-formation, rejecting the very desirability of the work ethic which 
permeates much of the history Western social and political thought.  
 This thesis addresses these contemporary concerns by asking whether there are any 
Hegelian resources for conceptualizing these kinds of political demands in the name of 
actualizing social freedom at an institutional level. While a full response to this broad question 
requires an analysis of these demands on their own terms and is thus outside the scope of this 
                                                 
2 For a recent overview of the varieties of universal basic income, arguments in its favor, and responses to 
several standard criticisms, see Philippe van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical 
Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Harvard University Press, 2017). 
3 For a recent overview of proposals for a reduction in the working week and increased automation (in 
addition to universal basic income) from a leftist perspective, see Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, 
Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (Verso, 2015). 
4 E.g., Bernie Sanders’ proposal for state-guaranteed employment for workers unable to find a job. Jeff 
Stein, “Bernie Sanders to Announce Plan to Guarantee Every American a Job,” The Washington Post, 
April 23, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/23/bernie-sanders-to-unveil-
plan-to-guarantee-every-american-a-job. 
5 E.g., Barack Obama’s push for state-sponsored job skills training through the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act. Gregory Korte, “Obama Signs Bill to Overhaul Job Training Programs,” USA Today, 
July 22, 2014. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/07/22/obama-job-training-
bill/12987339. 
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historically oriented thesis, I argue that Hegel’s encounter with machine automation permits us to 
respond with a provisional yes, primarily because of his insight that we cannot remain blind to 
the inner-workings of particular jobs and labor processes, i.e., their content and quality, in 
evaluating their normative desirability at a political-institutional level.6 The quality of one’s 
labor is ethically significant because it fundamentally shapes the Bildung or ethical subjectivity 
of its undertaker, and does so not just at the idealist heights of one’s self-conception but even at 
the material base of one’s habituated and embodied “being-together-with-one’s-own-self” (EM 
§410A). This moment of Hegel’s general critique of moral and economic formalism invites us, 
alongside Marx, into the hidden abode of production so that we may question the desirability of 
institutions which encourage and support the existence of, say, numerous meta-search engines 
for wealthy tourists, the proliferation of messaging and networking platforms which profit 
primarily off of their users’ unpaid labor, or the any number of “bullshit jobs” 7 which occupy the 
time and concern of large swaths of the working population of the increasingly 
“deindustrialized” economies of Western countries.8 In this way, Hegel’s two-sided ethical 
treatment of labor which identifies both labor’s contributions to subjective Bildung and its 
radical inability to prevent subjective deformation—an acknowledgement, in other words, of 
both the market’s irreducible importance as well as its fundamental limits—has particular 
contemporary relevance.  
                                                 
6 Hegel calls the state’s institutional arrangement its political constitution, which he understands as also 
including the political attitude of the its citizens (PR §§260–270). 
7 David Graeber, “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant,” Strike, August 2013, 
https://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs. See also David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (Simon & Schuster, 
2018). 
8 Wolfgang Streeck, “How will Capitalism End?,” New Left Review 87 (2014): 35f.  
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 Before turning to Hegel’s text, however, I would like to position my interpretive project 
more explicitly among contemporary Anglophone scholarship on Hegel’s political philosophy 
and social theory. The most influential study of labor in the interpretation of Hegel’s thought in 
the twentieth century has been Alexandre Kojève’s (1902–1968) lectures on the Phenomenology 
of Spirit delivered at the Sorbonne between 1934 and 1939.9 Influenced by both the young 
Marx’s recently published notebooks—the so-called Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844—as well as Heideggerian existentialism, Kojève’s lectures extend the role of labor and 
recognition developed in the Phenomenology’s master-slave dialectic to characterize the inner 
core of Hegel’s conception of history and, ultimately, the whole of his social and political 
thought. “All of History—that is, the whole ‘movement’ of human existence in the natural 
World,” Kojève writes, “is nothing but the progressive negation of Slavery by the Slave, the 
series of his successive ‘conversions’ to Freedom [through Work].”10  
 My interpretation of the role of labor in Hegel’s politics, however, fundamentally differs 
from that of Kojève’s and his followers’, as my focus is on Hegel’s mature political thought as 
he develops it in the Philosophy of Right and, to a lesser degree, the sections on objective spirit 
in the Encyclopaedia. Kojève, in contrast, takes an exclusive interest in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which, alongside other Marxists readers of Hegel of the day such as Georg Lukács (1885–
                                                 
9 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
trans. Raymond Queneau (Cornell University Press, 1980). 
10 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 225. Kojève discusses the importance of labor in the 
master-slave dialectic throughout the famous first chapter (3–30). See also 144f: “It is Work, and only 
Work, that transforms the World in an essential manner, by creating truly new realities.” For critical 
discussions of Kojève’s reading as it pertains to the Philosophy of Right, see Anders Bartonek, “Labour 
Against Capitalism? Hegel’s Concept of Labour in Between Civil Society and the State,” Culture 
Unbound 6, no. 1 (2014): 120 and Giorgio Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion of Abstract Labor in the Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right,” in Hegel and Capitalism, ed. Andrew Buchwalter (State University of New 
York Press, 2015), 98n14. 
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1971), he argues contains Hegel’s most rigorously philosophical conception of the state, society, 
and political life.11 As a consequence of my exclusive focus on Hegel’s mature writing, I will not 
directly address Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of labor (through which he ascribes 
world-historical significance to the slave’s labor) or his critics.12 While a treatment of the 
consistency of Hegel’s social and political thought throughout his lifetime is beyond the scope of 
my thesis, I hope to evince that Hegel provides compelling arguments for his concept of labor 
and its ethical implications within his mature political writings. 
 Today, many of the most influential Anglophone interpretations of Hegel’s mature social 
theory have moved away from ascribing a central role to labor in either his theory of subject-
formation or the various problems which arise in his theory of civil society. Thus, for many 
contemporary influential interpreters of Hegel’s social theory such Frederick Neuhouser, the 
ethical significance of the processes of civil society—both their deficiencies and achievements—
are evaluated in terms of which the labor process is largely absent.13 As a result, interpreters like 
Neuhouser are subsequently unable to satisfactorily make sense of Hegel’s notion of abstract 
labor, which fundamentally characterizes the deplorable conditions of a repetitive, unfulfilling, 
and uncultivating factory labor process, or how Hegel could endorse the automation of some 
                                                 
11 Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations Between Dialectics and Economics (MIT 
Press, 1977), 449–464 and passim. 
12 For just a couple of these criticisms see (most recently) Paul Redding, “The Role of Work within the 
Processes of Recognition in Hegel’s Idealism,” in New Philosophies of Labour: Work and the Social 
Bond, ed. Nicholas Smith and Jean-Philippe Deranty (Brill, 2012), 41ff and 59f; H. S. Harris, Hegel’s 
Ladder (Hackett, 1997), 379n33; Armstrong George Kelly, “Notes on Hegel’s ‘Lordship and Bondage,’” 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Jon Stewart (State 
University of New York Press, 1998), 172–91; Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hegel’s Dialectic of Self-
Consciousness,” in Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (Yale 
University Press, 1976). 
13 Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Harvard University 
Press, 2003). While undiscussed here, both Charles Taylor and Allen Wood also neglect labor in their 
interpretation of Hegel’s social theory (Charles Taylor, Hegel [Cambridge University Press, 1977]; Allen 
Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought [Cambridge University Press, 1990]). 
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jobs, but not others. To make these claims intelligible, I argue, we must take Hegel as 
articulating substantial constraints on what kinds of market-determined activity counts as 
properly subject-forming. Of those contemporary Anglophone interpreters that do investigate 
Hegel’s mature concept of labor on its own terms, most are concerned with the issues of poverty 
and the rabble (Pöbel) rather than the labor process itself.14 While the problem of poverty in 
Hegel’s theory of civil society is certainly salient in the analysis of abstract labor and machine 
automation, any investigation which fails to extend its analysis of poverty and the rabble to 
modern labor processes also fails to acknowledge the essential connection between labor and 
ethical life and the importance of Hegel’s remarks on mechanistic labor and machine automation. 
By considering Hegel’s critique of abstract labor primarily from the perspective of the labor 
process itself, my interpretation of this concept challenges those similar to Neuhouser’s, which 
understand abstract labor instead as describing the novel kind of social relations produced by 
civil society’s requirements of universal exchange and formal equality. 
 In the following section, I address the context and general argument of the Philosophy of 
Right and explain the concept of the free will which stands at its base (Section II). In the third 
section, I give an account of Hegel’s concept of labor as it develops out of the sociality of needs 
and explain in broad outline why Hegel thinks labor plays a central ethical function in modern 
society (Section III). Next, I address Hegel’s complicated notion of abstract labor and its most 
common misinterpretations (Section IV). In this section, I also show more specifically how labor 
                                                 
14 The most notable scholar in this camp is Shlomo Avineri, who tackles many of the issues concerning 
civil society addressed in this thesis from the perspective of poverty rather than the nature of the labor 
process itself (Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State [Cambridge University Press, 1972]). 
More recently, Frank Ruda has analyzed the rabble as the irreducible hole within civil society that, as the 
sole example of non-sublatable, non-dialectical difference in Hegel’s system, retroactively both 
challenges and makes possible the state (Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right [Continuum, 2011]).  
   
7 
is, for Hegel, necessary for the formation of Bildung and that Hegel’s concept of Bildung is 
importantly linked to the ideas of habit and ethical subjectivity or subject-formation. In the fifth 
section, I address why abstract labor deadens its undertakers and show that Hegel purposes 
machine automation as their remedy, which I argue ought to be read as consistent with his 
scientific approach to the state and labor described in sections II, III, and IV (Section V).  
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2 THE CONTEXT AND SCIENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
 The stated goal of the Philosophy of Right is to “comprehend and portray the state as 
inherently rational entity” which entails “showing how the state, as the ethical universe, should 
be recognized” (PR 21). This task is fulfilled by an ever-deepening account of freedom as it 
develops through the stages of right (PR §30), which ultimately culminates in the state, “the 
spirit which is present in the world” (PR §270R).15 The state is worthy of rational recognition 
precisely because it actualizes “substantial freedom,” the fullest, most self-aware expression of 
human freedom (PR §257). The modern state’s “strength” comes from its assurance of the 
individual’s “complete freedom of particularity” (PR §260A) though its integration of the two 
other institutions of modern ethical life: the family and civil society (PR §§260–261). For Hegel, 
“civil society”—literally bürgerliche Gesellschaft or bourgeois society—signifies the “system of 
atomism” (EM §523) in which the natural immediacy fostered by the family is superseded by the 
private and productive “universal egoism”16 of particularized individuals (PR §182A; PR 
§289R17). 
Within Hegel’s philosophical system outlined in the Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Right 
expands on the Encyclopaedia sections found under the heading “objective spirit,” which itself is 
located in the last position of the architectonic sequence: logic, nature, spirit. The full realization 
of objective spirit is achieved in what Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit), which is itself divided 
                                                 
15 The state, for Hegel, is thus the central locus of ethical life and always takes on an ethical significance 
beyond that of a prudent political organization; the state describes the total organization of a world: “the 
state is the divine will as present spirit, unfolding as the actual shape and organization of a world” (PR 
§270R).  
16 Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 134.  
17 “Civil society is the field of conflict in which the private interest of each individual comes up against 
that of everyone else” (PR §289R). Marx rightly suggests reading this passage as Hegel’s “definition of 
civil society as the bellum omnium contra omnes” (Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, 
ed. Joseph J O’Malley, trans. Annette Jolin [Cambridge University Press, 1972], 42). 
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into three parts: the family (PR §§158–181), civil society (PR §§182–256), and the state (PR 
§§257–360).18 The institution of the modern family in marriage, the sharing of familial 
resources, and the rearing of children constitutes the immediate and natural existence of ethical 
life (PR §157; PR §160). This realm of ethicality is primarily engaged through individuals’ love 
and feeling (PR §158), and, in general, casts the “sensuous moment which pertains to natural 
life… in its ethical context” (PR §164). Hegel’s sections on the family thus attempt to recuperate 
the spontaneous kinship relations found in any human society into a modern theory of ethical 
life, giving these at first merely natural kinship relationships an ethical role and value.  
We will develop the two other spheres of ethical life more fully throughout our investigation; 
however, two points of clarification about the relationship between civil society and the state are 
now in order. First, Hegel’s tripartite division of ethical life does not give equal weight and 
interconnectedness to each division.19 Rather, civil society is closer to the state than to the family. 
In the both the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopaedia, Hegel calls civil society the “external 
state” (PR §183; EM §523) and, in the former, acknowledges that civil society is often confused 
with the state (PR §258R), a misrecognition unlikely to be made between the family and civil 
society despite Hegel’s attempt to characterize civil society as a “universal family” apropos the 
corporations (PR §239). Second, we must resist the temptation to map the spheres of civil society 
and the state to the spheres of economics and politics as we ordinarily understand these terms. 
While this mapping does capture some sense of Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the 
                                                 
18 Ethical life is the full realization of spirit and freedom because it actualizes both subjective and 
objective well-being and thus provides genuine reconciliation: “the unity of the subjective with the 
objective good which has being in and for itself is ethical life, and the reconciliation which takes place in 
it is in accord with the concept” (PR §141A).  
19 In typical Hegelian fashion, this gradation of the divisions’ depth and importance is reflected in the 
amount of content required for their development. Measured quantitatively: 23 sections (about 20 pages 
or 11%) for the family, 74 sections (54 pages or 37%) for civil society, and 103 sections or (105 pages or 
52%) for the state.  
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state, his insistence that the corporations, the police, and the juridical system all fall within the 
realm of civil society, if taken seriously and not as an external forcing of this material into a ridged 
and dogmatic schematic, indicates that Hegel views civil society as encompassing aspects of social 
life that we would ordinarily consider to be political (hence his description of civil society as the 
external state).20 Moreover, Hegel was aware of the ambiguities in the English usage of the term 
civil society, which found divergent and often contradictory meanings in the works of Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, and took this ambiguity to indicate the 
true dialectical nature of the political-economic relationship. 21  Thus, we ought to understand 
Hegel’s state as referring in the first instance not to the political aspects of society in opposition to 
the economic ones, but rather to the spiritual-organic unity and logical ground of the sociopolitical 
realm itself.22 
While the state may be something like the last word on social freedom, the other stages of 
right are not to be understood as wrong paths taken along the way. Rather, each prior stage of 
right develops a particular aspect of freedom missing from the others. Each “is a distinct variety 
of right, because each of them gives determinate shape and existence to freedom” (PR §30R). 
The upshot of Hegel’s progressive conception of right is that each stage of right must be 
understood as uniquely contributing to the actualization of freedom—including, of course, civil 
                                                 
20 Cf. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 4f.  
21  For Hegel’s knowledge of the conceptual confusion surrounding the term civil society see Gareth 
Stedman Jones, “Hegel and the Economics of Civil Society,” Civil Society: History and Possibilities, 2001, 
105–30 and Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 141ff. According to Avineri, Hegel was likely 
“reading Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society” during his time in Berlin (Avineri, 
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 141n28). 
22 Despite appearing last in the mode of presentation, Hegel understands ethical life, and, in turn, the state, 
as the logical foundation of each preceding moment. Thus Hegel writes that “the sphere of right and that 
of morality cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation” (PR 
§141A). Frank Ruda has helpfully theorized this process of grounding as Hegel’s logic of retroaction, cf. 
Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 105f and Frank Ruda, “Hegel’s First Words,” in The Dash―The Other Side 
of Absolute Knowing (MIT Press, 2018), 87–105. 
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society. Understood as rational, the social practices of civil society must not exist merely as 
necessary evils to be contained and remediated by the state, but must instead somehow positively 
contribute to human freedom. Therefore, Hegel must explain how any practice identified as a 
necessary element of civil society (such as labor) contributes to the actualization of freedom, or, 
at the very least, he must make intelligible the sacrifices that such an element demands as a part 
of an organic whole. In short, Hegel is faced with the task of reconciliation: he must demonstrate 
how each aspect of civil society substantiates and preserves our “subjective freedom” within the 
modern state (PR 22). 
This process of actualizing social freedom begins with the concept of the free will (PR §4).  
Each stage of right is, taken formally, the embodiment of a new kind of will (PR §§5–7; EM 
§487), and each obtains its “external material” from both the natural realm, including within it 
human biology, and the sociosymbolic realm of human social relations (EM §483). The free will 
which emerges from this process of actualization both obtains objectivity—my freedom is no 
longer my arbitrary caprice but is instead the result of my conscious interaction with nature and 
others—and is raised to the world of spirit, a process which Hegel characterizes as translation: 
“the activity of the will consists in sublating the contradiction between subjectivity and 
objectivity and in translating its end from their subjective determination into an objective one, 
while at the same time remaining with itself in this objectivity” (PR §28, cf. PR §§8–9). This 
means that the “absolute drive” of the free will is to realize itself within objective social 
existence, which requires that it sublate the realm of “negative freedom” or “the freedom of the 
   
12 
understanding” and enter realm of substantial freedom mediated through rational thought. This 
unity of the free will and its existence Hegel calls the idea of right (PR §29).23  
The Philosophy of Right is Hegel’s sustained investigation of this idea of right as the unity of 
concept of right and its realization (PR §30). The investigation is a science because it is an 
immanent development of this idea such that no external logical or empirical content need be 
imported to articulate its rational organization; it employs a method in which “its progress does 
not depend on the assertion that various circumstances are present or on the subsequent 
application of the universal to such material of extraneous origin” (PR §31).24 Hegel’s scientific 
method thus places his political thought between the two poles of positivistic empiricism and 
rational formalism.25 Contra empiricism, the presence of contingent circumstances (this or that 
kind of state, political constitution, election result, etc.) cannot be the ultimate arbitrator of what 
counts as the actualization of right. Thus, unlike the contemporary understanding of science as 
the realm of thought concerned precisely with the empirical investigation of natural and social 
states of affairs, for Hegel the significance of science is garnered only when thought severs its 
unequivocal dependency on contingent circumstances, which does not, of course, amount to a 
denial of contingency tout court. Contra formalism, however, the philosophical project of the 
Philosophy of Right cannot be understood as an ex ante application of logic for the construction 
                                                 
23 For a full account of what Hegel takes to be the insufficiency (yet necessary presupposition) of the 
concept of the free will for the development of a complete account of objective spirit, see Allen Wood, 
Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 58–73 and David James, “Practical 
Necessity and the ‘Logic’ of Civil Society,” in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right: A Critical 
Guide, ed. David James (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 179–184. 
24 Cf. Hegel’s discussion of science’s “absolute method” in the 1812 and 1831 prefaces to the Science of 
Logic, esp. pp. 9–12 and his similar methodological reflections in the final section on absolute idea, pp. 
736–753 (Georg Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni [Cambridge University Press, 
2010]). 
25 For an account of why this opposition of empiricism and formalism is, in the context of Hegel’s 
absolute spirit, a false dichotomy, see Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda, The Dash, 11–28.  
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of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a just or ethical society à la Plato, a task which 
amounts to nothing more than the thoughtless subsumption of a given content under an abstract 
universal.26 Rather, as Hegel famously writes in the introduction to the Science of Logic, the task 
of philosophy-as-science is “simply to take up, what is there before us”27 or, equivalently, “to 
comprehend what is” (PR 21). For a scientific analysis of society Hegel need only take up what 
is before him because “it can only be the nature of the content which is responsible for movement 
in scientific knowledge, for it is the content’s own reflection that first posits and generates what 
that content is.”28 The social world, in other words, generates its own rational content or 
undertakes its own autoanaylsis, and any divergence from this methodological principle can only 
introduce heteronomy and externality into its philosophical deduction. Each aspect of true 
sociality returns to its rational kernel as its own result: the “series of concepts” (the categories of 
the Philosophy of Right) and the “series of shapes” (the empirical content of the ethical state) are 
ultimately “one and the same thing (PR §32). 
As an implication of its status as a science, Hegel’s social theory is deeply historicist as well 
as historical such that the theory itself as well as our comprehension of it cannot be separated 
from the concrete conditions of its actuality.29 Consistent with his thoroughgoing critique of 
empty oughts—whatever philosophy is, it certainly does not involve “issuing instructions on 
how the world ought to be” (PR 23)—Hegel’s account of labor and civil society is not intended 
to be a series of commandments from on high; rather, it takes the rationality and actuality of the 
                                                 
26 Hegel condemns Plato’s Republic as an “empty ideal” (PR 20f) and a suppression of the principle of 
subjectivity (PR §262A).  
27 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 47/21.55.  
28 Ibid., 9f/21.7f. 
29 For Hegel’s inversion of Kant’s abstract and necessary conditions of possibility, see Rocío Zambrana, 
Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility (The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 74. 
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present as its point of departure (PR 20).30 Thus, in light of Hegel’s dialectical method, the 
Philosophy of Right must be read as simultaneously directing its gaze solely upon sociopolitical 
reality, never beyond or above it, while also discerning within this reality a logic or rationality of 
which this reality would be its symptom, appearance, or expression—and all of this without 
reducing the real to a mere determination of the universal logos alone (as this would eliminate 
the principle of subjectivity so central to Hegel’s theory of modernity [PR §316A; PR §317A]). 
Thus, Hegel’s own historical milieu, and especially the economic and political realities of his 
early nineteenth-century Germany, are essential constituents of (yet nonidentical and 
nonisomorphic with) his political thought. And while a proper addressing of these historical 
conditions would take us beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to bear in mind that 
machine automation was more or less non-existent in Germany during the period in which Hegel 
wrote the Philosophy of Right. Thus, Hegel likely arrived at the idea from both a logical 
following out of the tendencies of already-existing industrial production and from second-hand 
accounts of English political economists.31 The significance of these methodological and 
historical observations will be seen when we consider the success of Hegel’s solutions to the 
problems of civil society.   
                                                 
30 It is for this reason why the label ‘social theory’ is more apt than ‘political philosophy’ for describing 
Hegel’s project. If political philosophy today is concerned primarily with what is known as ideal theory 
or, as Isaiah Berlin writes of his Oxford mentor Douglas Cole’s view, that today we accept that “political 
theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery, or application, of moral notions 
in the sphere of political relations,” then the Philosophy of Right is in many ways un-, or even anti-, 
philosophical (Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on 
Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy [Oxford University Press, 2002], 168). 
31 See Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, 367: “[Hegel’s political philosophy’s] essential features reflect 
less the contemporary state of Germany than the social and economic problems that arose on a European 
scale in the wake of the French revolution and the Industrial Revolution in England.” 
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3 HEGEL’S CONCEPTS OF LABOR AND ABSTRACTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF RIGHT 
  The concept of “labor” or “work” (Arbeit)32 plays various roles throughout Hegel’s 
philosophy. We can sort these roles into approximately three categories: the activity or general 
form of labor (developed primarily in the Phenomenology’s master-slave dialectic), the 
objectivity and sociality of labor in modern economic life (developed primarily in the Philosophy 
of Right), and the conceptuality of labor or labor in thought—the labor of the negative, the labor 
of the concept, the labor of spirit, and so on (developed primarily in the various introductory 
material of the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Encyclopedia).33 While there is some sense of 
unity between these three meanings of labor in Hegel’s writings, in accordance with my focus on 
Hegel’s mature social theory I limit my analysis to Hegel’s treatment of the second, more 
directly economic type of labor in the Philosophy of Right and Encyclopedia. 
 Hegel’s account of civil society is divided into three parts: “The System of Needs” (PR 
§§189–208), “The Administration of Justice” (PR §§209–229), and “The Police and the 
Corporation” (PR §§230–256). His account of economic labor is primarily laid out in the first of 
these three divisions, in three paragraphs grouped under the subheading “The Nature of Work” 
(PR §§196–198). Broadly speaking, in these three paragraphs Hegel gives labor a central role 
                                                 
32 Throughout this thesis, I use the English word “labor” to refer to the German noun “die Arbeit.” 
Nisbet’s translation of the Philosophy of Right uses both “work” and “labour” to translate Arbeit. 
Quotations using “work” or “labour” always refer to Arbeit.  
33 We could also add a fourth kind of labor found in Hegel’s philosophy of religion concerned with the 
Protestant question of justification by works. However, in these contexts, Hegel, following Martin Luther, 
often uses the noun Werke instead of Arbeiten (e.g., “des Gesetzes Werke” in Luther’s translation of 
Romans). For a brief account of Luther’s influence on Hegel regarding the ethical necessity of laboring in 
civil society see Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, pp. 6–9. For a longer treatment that also touches more 
generally on Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, see Joachim Ritter “Hegel and the Reformation,” in Hegel and 
the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (MIT Press, 
1984). 
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within civil society, characterizing it as “process of formation” which gives “means their value” 
and the “mediation” of these means by needs (PR §196). Labor is, in other words, the medium 
through which need and satisfaction become socially intertwined, as is evinced in Hegel’s 
definition of the system of needs as “the mediation of need and the satisfaction of the individual 
through his work and through the work and satisfaction of the needs of all the others” (PR §188). 
Moreover, Hegel’s ethical conception of labor relies on its formation not only of the “material 
which is immediately provided by nature” but also of the subjectivity and needs of the worker. It 
is this characterization of labor as formative of both the product of labor and the laborer herself 
that constitutes labor’s fundamental determination for Hegel; and it is both product and worker, 
subject and object, individual subjectivity and external nature that give and receive from through 
labor.34 The achievement of rational human subjectivity through labor is a dialectical working-
through of both sides of this relation, a “process of self-production both by going out of himself 
and by educating himself inwardly” (PR §10A). This reciprocal formation of subject and object 
permeates each of labor’s three guises outline above, but is particularly central in Hegel’s theory 
of modern civil society and its influence on the process of ethical subject-formation. 
 In addition to reciprocally mediating subjectivity and sociality through the generation and 
satisfaction of need, modern labor processes also impute on both of these extremes a certain form 
of universality that Hegel calls abstract. This tendency towards abstraction manifests repeatedly 
in Hegel’s theorization of social need, reoccurring in PR §§190–192 and EM §525. In these 
sections, Hegel argues that abstraction infects not only the “quality of both needs and means” but 
also “the mutual relations between individuals” (PR §192) and, of course, the labor process itself 
                                                 
34 Hegel’s distinction between labor’s two kinds of formation—educational versus productive—is 
described in Anders Bartonek, “Labour Against Capitalism?,” 115 and Michael Hardt, “The Withering of 
Civil Society,” Social Text, no. 45 (1995), 28f.  
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(PR §198). As the division of labor and economic interdependence become ubiquitous within 
civil society, social needs, labor processes, and subjective attitudes towards others all become 
colored by abstraction, leading individuals to develop a “habit of abstraction in enjoyment, 
information, knowledge, and behavior” (EM §525).  
However, despite the proliferation of abstraction in his account of the various features of 
modern needs-satisfaction, pinning down the precise meaning of abstraction in this context is 
difficult. Unlike other of Hegel’s central metaphysical categories, abstraction and its contrast 
term, concertation or the concrete, never receive a direct treatment in the either of the two logics. 
Yet, the words abstract and concrete proliferate throughout all of Hegel’s writings. This situation 
has led one interpreter to conclude that the intelligibility of Hegel’s concept of abstraction is 
even more dependent upon grasping the totality of the logic than the other standard-issue 
categories that fill its table of contents.35 Nonetheless, while abstraction is usually charged with a 
negative valiance for Hegel (and a positive one for concretion)—take the narrowness of abstract 
right,36 the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the understanding (PR §1R; PR 
§10R), or the notorious abstract universal, for just a couple of examples—Hegel clearly 
                                                 
35 “Hegel's doctrine of abstraction is not finally intelligible apart from the details of his most 
distinctive conception, the Concept, the explication of which is, in a sense, the whole burden of 
the Logic” (Philip Grier, “Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic,” in Essays on Hegel’s Logic, ed. 
George di Giovanni (State University of New York Press, 1990), 59–76). Grier intends this point to be 
non-trivial, as he thinks many of the other Hegelian categories can be understood, at least in their most 
important significations, outside of the totality of the logic. Cf. also Errol Harris’ response in which he 
argues that abstract/concrete are not categories and can thus be appropriately applied in equal degree to 
every stage of the dialectic or category of the logic (Errol Harris, “A Reply to Philip Grier,” in Essays on 
Hegel’s Logic, 77–84). 
36 Thus, Frank Ruda correctly writes that the “abstractness” in abstract right “refers to the fact that 
personality as fundament of right is gained by abstracting from all determinations which define an 
individual in a state” (Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 199n9). 
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understands processes of abstraction to be a constitutive part of social freedom.37 The term’s 
fundamental ambiguity, both in its metaphysical and its ethical-political senses, has not failed in 
leading astray many interpreters of Hegel’s concept of abstract labor, two of which we will 
address later. Before that, however, I will outline briefly what I take to be the most salient 
aspects of abstraction within the context of the Philosophy of Right, with an emphasis on its 
significance for Hegel’s understanding of the modern labor process. 
In his account of concept of the will in the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
characterizes abstraction as the will’s ability to strip away any specific content or determinacy 
from one’s self-conception or, in other words, the will’s capacity to eliminate any external 
relations it has to the world, other wills, objects, and so on—an ability which constitutes the 
will’s moment of pure indeterminacy.38 The deeper meaning of this seemingly arbitrary capacity 
of abstraction held by self-consciousness is, for Hegel, that such a stripping-away necessitates a 
decontextualization from the constitutive elements of self-consciousness; that is, to conceive of a 
thing abstractly or to conceive of a thing in isolation from its relations to others is to conceive of 
the thing as not the thing that it really is. It is for this reason, as Hegel repeatedly points out, that 
complete abstraction is, strictly speaking, impossible, as any abstraction from all determinations 
is always itself an act of determining, namely a determining as abstract. As a result, the will’s 
capacity for abstraction “is not true infinity or the concrete universality of the concept, but only 
something determinate and one-sided” since “abstract[ing] from all determinacy, it is itself not 
                                                 
37 Hegel sees this tendency towards abstraction as an underlying feature of modern society and modern 
subjectivity more generally. See for example the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirt, trans. A. V. 
Miller (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 9.  
38 In his 1824–25 lectures on the Philosophy of Right, Hegel gestures more explicitly towards the ethical 
implications of the will’s capacity for abstraction: “The human being can abstract from every content, 
make himself free of it, whatever is in my representation I can let go, I can make myself entirely empty… 
the human being has the self-consciousness of being able to take up any content, or of letting it go, he can 
let go of all bonds of friendship, love, whatever they may be (VPR IV 111f)” 
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without determinacy; and the fact that it is abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy, 
deficiency, and finitude” (PR §6A). In other words, in abstracting from any given content or 
from all determinacy, the will fails to achieve what it sets out to do—viz., realize itself as a 
genuine universal—and so its striving for “pure indeterminacy” (PR §5) turns out to be just 
another kind of determinacy.  
Shifting our focus back to abstraction in the context of civil society, it is for this reason that 
we cannot say that modern civil society’s needs, labor processes, and social relations—all 
characterized by abstraction—are indeterminate and ethically neutral. While such needs, labor, 
and social relations are formally free (in the sense that their determining is the result of legally 
unrestricted subjective arbitrariness39), they are nonetheless determined by this formal freedom 
as the products of subjective caprice (and thus are not necessarily in accordance with the 
demands of self-conscious ethicality). Hegel argues that this formal freedom is deficient in part 
because it is the product of conceptual distinction-making and social differentiation undertaken 
without concern for whether these abstractions actually realize the freedom of all members of 
society, and, as such, are one-sided activities characteristic of the cognitive faculty of the 
understanding (EM §525).40 In this sense, Hegel’s notion of abstract social need may be mapped 
onto the standard concept of utility central to economic thinking at least since Samuel von 
Pufendorf (1632–1694), generally defined as “the capacity of a good or service to satisfy a want, 
                                                 
39 In civil society, “the ultimate and essential determinant is subjective opinion and the particular arbitrary 
will” (PR §206). On this point, see Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, “Why Ethical Life is Fragile: 
Rights, Markets and States in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Elements of the Philosophy of Right: A 
Critical Guide, ed. David James, 142. 
40 “The intellect draws distinctions among needs and thereby multiplies indefinitely both the 
needs themselves and the means for these different needs, making the needs and the means ever 
more abstract.” 
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of whatever kind.”41 However, for Hegel, the notion of abstraction extends beyond the confines 
of descriptive theorizing of decision-making under scarcity and comes to characterize “formal 
culture in general” or the entire sphere of civil society, both the subjectivities of its members and 
the objective forms of labor, need, and social relations (EM §525). In these spheres, the tendency 
towards abstraction is a movement towards formal universality, in the sense that each of these 
spheres begins to orient itself around exchange and need in general rather than concrete need, on 
the one hand, and their processes of realization become mechanistic and narrowly specialized, on 
the other. For example, Hegel argues that, under the sway of abstraction, the generation of social 
needs becomes determined primarily by the principle of profit as opposed to the concrete desires 
of individuals (PR §191A); relations between individuals become formally identical as persons 
are treated as universal consumers, not as members of a particular gender, class, race, nationality, 
etc. (PR §209A); these social relations become mediated by the universal means exchange, 
money (PR §204); and each labor process becomes oriented around the specialized mass-
production of a single commodity against the background of wide-reaching markets of exchange 
(PR §192).  
While the specifically modern innovation of abstraction is a constitutive moment of 
actualized social freedom, Hegel is quick to ethically problematize what he takes to be the 
widespread yet unjustifiable elevation of this moment of freedom above all others. As we have 
seen, Hegel associates the subjective attitude which unduly privileges the will’s capacity for 
abstraction with the undialectical Verstand or faculty of the understanding (as opposed to 
Vernunft or reason). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel even connects this attitude with the 
                                                 
41 R. D. Collison Black, “Utility,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, eds. Lawrence E. 
Blume and Steven N. Durlauf (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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subjective disposition of the rabble.42 While this first mode of entangling the processes of 
abstraction with the understanding is to be expected—Hegel correlates these two in nearly all of 
his writings—the second is more surprising. The rabble, the abjected and indignant poor 
unintegratable into ethical life, are characterized precisely by their lack of education and 
rebelliousness towards government and society writ large. That the rabble is simultaneously for 
Hegel a paradigm of an essential, albeit deficient, moment in the process of cognition and social 
freedom in general is puzzling. However, we can make some sense of Hegel’s entanglement of 
the rabble with the understanding’s abstraction by noting that, for Hegel, an over-emphasis on 
abstraction in theory has implications for the development of ethical subjectivity in practice. In 
fetishizing the theoretical moment of the “negative understanding” (PR §272), the rabble 
become ethically deficient by developing an unconditional distrust of the state and its 
bureaucrats. This is because by privileging abstraction in their conception of right, the rabble 
“take the negative as a starting-point” and thus view “malevolence and distrust of malevolence” 
as the fundamental motors of political-institutional organization. In characterizing the rabble in 
this way, Hegel connects abstraction with disparate aspects of his social theory: the constitution 
of the will (the moment of the will’s negativity), the activity of thought (the faculty of 
understanding), and a deficiency in one’s ethical disposition (the rabble’s distrust), in addition to 
the descriptive transformations in labor, need, and social relations produced by the ascendancy of 
abstraction within the system of needs, thus demonstrating the wide and multifarious roles 
                                                 
42 “To take the negative as a starting-point and to make malevolence and distrust of malevolence the 
primary factor… is, as far as thought it concerned, characteristic of the negative understanding and, as far 
as the disposition is concerned, characteristic of the outlook of the rabble” (PR §272); “it characteristic of 
the rabble, and of the negative viewpoint in general, to assume ill will, or less than good will, on the part 
of the government” (PR §301). For the topic of the rabble’s relationship to the understanding and 
abstraction see Matt S. Whitt, “The problem of Poverty and the Limits of Freedom in Hegel’s Theory of 
the Ethical State,” Political Theory 41, no. 2 (2013), 280. 
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abstraction plays in his mature social theory.43 As Michael Hardt writes, Hegel’s civil society is 
in the first instance not the organization of labor as such, but the “organization of abstract 
labor.”44 It is to this notion that we now turn.  
  
  
                                                 
43 For a critical discussion of Hegel’s association of the rabble with the negative understanding, see Frank 
Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 115ff. Ruda argues that Hegel cannot make this association, as the negative 
understanding’s abstraction from all determination is always an arbitrary subjective decision whereas the 
making of the rabble is a necessary development of civil society, independent of any subjective caprice.  
44 Michael Hardt, “The Withering of Civil Society,” Social Text 45 (1995), 29. 
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4 WHO LABORS ABSTRACTLY? ABSTRACT LABOR, HABIT, AND BILDUNG IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
Now that we have laid out a few of the many meanings of abstraction at play in Hegel’s 
conceptualization of civil society, we may turn to the central focus of the remainder of my 
argument: Hegel’s concept of abstract labor (abstrakte Arbeit). Given my focus, I quote its 
section in full in both the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia:  
The universal and objective aspect of work consists, however, in that process of 
abstraction which confers a specific character on means and needs and hence also 
on production, so giving rise to the division of labour. Through this division, the 
work of the individual becomes simpler, so that his skill at his abstract work 
becomes greater, as does the volume of his output. At the same time, this 
abstraction of skill and means makes the dependence and reciprocity of human 
beings in the satisfaction of their other needs complete and entirely necessary. 
Furthermore, the abstraction of production makes work increasingly mechanical, 
so that the human being is eventually able to step aside and let a machine take his 
place. (PR §198) 
Labour too thus becomes more abstract, and leads on the one hand by its 
uniformity to ease of labour and to increased production, on the other hand to 
restriction to one skill, and thus to a more unconditional dependence on the social 
system. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanical, and develops to the point 
where the machine can take the place of human labour. (EM §526) 
Summarizing briefly, abstract labor is the structure of labor typical of modern modes of 
needs-satisfaction; it describes, for Hegel, the “universal and objective” aspect of modern labor 
processes, characterized in effect by a sophisticated division of labor, wide-scale 
interdependency, and an increasing mechanization of, and use of machines in, the labor process. 
By abstract labor, Hegel means something more than just the social division of labor or the 
particularization and specialization required for success and competitive productivity in the 
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marketplace, a kind of labor we may henceforth call divided labor.45 Divided forms of labor are a 
subset of abstract labor; they engender a highly adaptive labor process in which each element 
tends towards its full discretization and independence, separating both the raw material and the 
laborer from the unified final product. Divided labor thus stands in contrast to many other kinds 
of labor such as the artisan’s craftsmanship, the peasant’s agricultural labor, and even the state 
bureaucrat’s intellectual labor. However, the notion of divided labor does not capture the subject-
forming aspects of abstract labor that Hegel wishes to highlight.  
Given Hegel’s emphasis on the ethical role of labor as subject-forming over its more overtly 
economical functions, it is no surprise that it is the deadening effects of abstract labor that most 
concern him.46 This priority of subject-formation in Hegel’s problematization of modern labor is 
evident in his distinction between mere poverty and the dehumanized rabble: “Poverty in itself 
does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with 
poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc.” (PR §244A, 
emphasis mine).47 In the case of the rabble, the heart of the problem lies in the specific kind of 
subjectivity produced by their position within the social structure. It is for this reason that Hegel 
is required to equally problematize a luxurious rich rabble in addition to an indignant poor one.48  
                                                 
45 I owe this distinction between merely divided and fully abstract labor to discussions with Sebastian 
Rand. Neuhouser makes much the same distinction when he gestures towards abstract labor as that 
“feature unique to civil society” which is “responsible for its having a formative function beyond those 
that follow merely from the general requirement, implicit in any social division of labor, namely, that 
labor be socially productive” (Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 162).  
46 This interpretation of Hegel’s concerns over abstract labor is aligned with those given by Waszek, “The 
Division of Labor,” 71f, Bartonek, “Labour Against Capitalism?,” 115ff, and Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion 
of Abstract Labor,” 93ff. 
47 The centrality of labor’s role in forming subjectivity is likewise evident in Hegel’s theory of 
the estates, discussed below. 
48 For a discussion of the distinction and necessary intertwining of these two forms of rabble see Frank 
Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, chapters 4–6. 
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In his expansive study of the Scottish Enlightenment’s influence on Hegel’s social theory, 
Norbert Waszek expands on this tension between abstract labor’s potential for subjective 
forming and deforming, on the one hand, and the efficiencies gained through divided labor, on 
the other, arguing that Hegel views abstract labor as a “two-edged weapon.”49 This is because, on 
the one hand, the spread of abstract labor in society brings many benefits to its members, in 
terms of both their material well-being and their intersubjective freedom. The division of labor, 
conceived by Hegel as a consequence of abstract labor, simplifies the tasks of labor and thereby 
increases the skill of each laborer at their limited task, and thus ultimately increases the overall 
productive output.50 Moreover, economic-productive interdependency becomes “complete and 
entirely necessary” (PR §198), solidifying the grounds of mutual recognition in civil society. 
Finally, by simplifying labor tasks and demanding continual increases in productivity, abstract 
labor also furnishes the possibility that deadening living labor may be replaced by machines in 
the future.  
On the other hand, however, abstract labor poses several ethical and political issues for the 
realization of social freedom. In particular, Hegel identifies three fundamental and wide-reaching 
social problems associated with the prevalence of abstract labor, all of which reappear 
throughout Hegel’s political writings: (1) “short-term economic disruptions” resulting in 
unemployment and poverty (2) social inequality, and (3) the deadening (Abstumpfung) of the 
                                                 
49 Norbert Waszek, “The Division of Labor: From the Scottish Enlightenment to Hegel,” The Owl of 
Minerva 15, no. 1 (1983), 72. See also Norbert Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account 
of ‘Civil Society’ (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), esp. chaps. 4 and 6. Avineri makes much the 
same point when characterizing “Hegel’s ambiguous attitude to civil society,” writing that “on one hand, 
[civil society] is the major achievement of the modern world; on the other, woe to that society of men that 
allows the forces of civil society to rule unimpeded” (Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 240). 
50 “Through this division, the work of the individual becomes simpler, so that his skill at his abstract work 
becomes greater, as does the volume of his output” (PR §198); abstract labor “leads on the one hand… to 
ease of labour and to increased production, on the other hand to restriction in one skill” (EM §526). 
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worker’s subjectivity as well as that of her community.51 Importantly, Hegel understands these 
problems to be structural, systematic, and necessary results of the modern labor process. 
Following the English economists whom he read, Hegel knew that such problems ought not to be 
“seen as a mere slip in the execution of an otherwise flawless scheme, but as a necessary result” 
whereby “the disadvantages are most intensely felt ‘where the division of labour is brought to 
perfection’.”52 Taken together, these issues demonstrate that Hegel was aware of many of the 
problems immanent to the nascent civil society emerging in the Western Europe at the beginning 
of the acutely nineteenth century.53 Only the issue of Abstumpfung, however, reflects the internal 
conditions of the changing labor process wrought by abstraction, so we will limit our analysis to 
it.  
4.1 Misunderstandings of Abstract Labor 
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor leads itself to a host of misunderstandings, not only 
because of its multitudinous role throughout his writings but equally because of the influence of 
Karl Marx on interpretations of Hegel’s social and political thought. Perhaps the most common 
line of misinterpretation of Hegel’s notion of abstract labor is the Marxist one, which attempts to 
find one of Marx’s concepts in Hegel’s. However, Marx’s notions of abstract labor, complex 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 72. According to Waszek, Hegel maintained the primacy of these three problems throughout all 
of his political writing, from the “Jena manuscripts to his last Berlin lectures.” (Waszek, “The Division of 
Labor,” 56). Shlomo Avineri also affirms the continuity of Hegel’s concern in his political writings for 
the social ills produced by the expanding scope and centrality of abstract labor in modern life (Hegel’s 
Theory of the Modern State, 98f). 
52 Waszek, “The Division of Labor,” 57, quoting Adam Smith, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. V, 539. As Karl Marx would later put a similar point, “it is 
inevitable that many people not of a criminal disposition are cut off from the green tree of morality” (Karl 
Marx, Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood, quoted in Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 81).  
53 Avineri correctly reiterates Waszek’s conclusion, writing that “Hegel emerges… as a philosopher 
acutely conscious of the achievements and the limitations of the modern age” and whose social theory 
contains “one of the most acute insights into the working of modern, industrial society” (Hegel’s Theory 
of the Modern State, ix, cf. 94). 
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labor, and alienated labor—the three most commonly misapplied—are decidedly not Hegel’s 
despite the latter’s influence on their development.  
For Marx, abstract labor refers to the labor process conceived from the perspective of its 
production of exchange-value as opposed to its production of use-value. Thus, Marx writes that 
abstract labor is “the general character as expenditure of human labor-power in the abstract”54 or 
the “common quality of being human labour in general.”55 Abstract labor is, in Marx’s sense, the 
common element that unifies all the different kinds of particularized concrete labor. Thus, while 
Marx and Hegel agree that abstract labor is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production 
insofar as it orients labor around the production of exchange-value, Hegel’s abstract labor differs 
from Marx’s for two principle reasons. First, Hegel’s concept of abstract labor cannot be 
separated from the formation of ethical subjectivity, understood as encompassing the needs and 
social relations of individuals.  Abstract labor both constitutes and challenges these aspects of 
subject-formation through its influence on the laborer’s Bildung. Second, Hegel’s concept of 
abstract labor refers to a particular kind of production process—modern industrial manufacturing 
and, the trade labor of the petite bourgeoisie, and all else that belongs to the “estate of trade and 
industry”—and not simply the quality of being labor in general, modern or otherwise, as in Marx 
(PR §204).  
Related to Marx’s concept of abstract labor is the infamous ‘reduction problem’ found at the 
beginning of Capital: the operation of reducing, for the purpose of analysis, all complex labor to 
its social average or to the amount of socially necessary simple labor.56 This, too, however, is not 
                                                 
54 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (Penguin Classics, 
1992), 308. 
55 Ibid., 142. See also Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
Martin Nicolaus (Penguin Classics, 1993), 296f. 
56 Ibid., 135. 
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Hegel’s concept of abstract labor. As Hegel’s discussions of political economy demonstrate, he 
certainly agrees with Marx that abstract labor is open to analysis (especially the discovery of 
universal laws working behind the backs of its undertakers) in a way unprecedented by previous 
organizations of labor and social need (PR §189R; PR §189A). However, this view of abstract 
labor fails to recognize that, for Hegel, not all labor in civil society is abstract in the social and 
ethical sense that he is concerned with; for Hegel, there exists labor which is not abstract labor, 
not so for Marx. The concrete labor of the peasantry and other agricultural laborers represented 
by Hegel’s “substantial or immediate estate,” despite holding an important role in civil society 
and being subject to discoverable economic laws and even to capitalistic industrial practices, 
opposes the abstract labor processes of the second “formal estate” that Hegel sees as more 
essential to modern civil society (PR §201). Thus, in his theory of the estates Hegel carves out a 
sphere of modern civil society that, while not appearing as this sphere’s distinguishing mark, is 
nonetheless uncolored by abstract labor as far as the ethicality of its way of living is concerned:  
In our times, the [agricultural] economy, too, is run in a reflective manner, like a 
factory, and it accordingly takes on a character like that of the second estate and 
opposed to its own character of naturalness. Nevertheless, this first estate will 
always retain the patriarchal way of life and the substantial disposition associated 
with it. The human being reacts here with immediate feeling as he accepts what 
he receives; he thanks God for it and lives in faith and confidence that this 
goodness will continue. What he receives is enough for him; he uses it up, for it 
will be replenished. This is a simple disposition which is not concerned with the 
acquisition of wealth; it may also be described as that of the old nobility, which 
consumed whatever it had. In this estate, the main part is played by nature, and 
human industry is subordinate to it. In the second estate, however, it is the 
understanding itself which is essential, and the products of nature can be regarded 
only as raw materials. (PR §203A) 
Since through the estates labor becomes correlated with a way of living and a particular 
subjective disposition (i.e., a certain kind of education and habit)—or rather, that the estates are 
the rational organization of these subjective phenomena emerging from the different kinds of 
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labor—the differences in disposition found among members of the three estates ultimately 
represent the ethical and educational differences among the three corresponding labor processes. 
Thus, for Hegel, the very existence of the agricultural and universal estates indicates that abstract 
labor is just one out of many ways of laboring in the ethical and educative sense, despite Hegel’s 
admittance that at least the former sphere “takes on a character like that of the second estate” and 
thus begins to incorporate aspects of abstract labor in a descriptive sense. It is for this reason why 
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor can neither be the commonality in which all forms of labor 
participate in (i.e., Marx’s concept of abstract labor oriented around the production of surplus-
value in the capitalist mode of production) or the analytic prerogative to qualitatively reduce all 
labor to some quantity of a unified and simple labor process (i.e., Marx’s reduction to simple 
socially necessary labor). 
Finally, Hegel’s forthright depiction of the negative ethical consequences of abstract labor 
(its dire working conditions, its inevitable poverty and social inequality, its separation of the 
laborer from the final product, its deadening of the laborer’s subjectivity and physical well-
being, and so on) has led some interpreters to read his concept of abstract labor as a prototype of 
the young Marx’s concept of alienated labor.57 While this interpretation has the benefit of 
correctly conceiving of Hegel’s concept of abstract labor as referring to a specific kind of labor 
process and its normative consequences, it fails to recognize that the ethical problems Hegel 
associates with abstract labor are decidedly not those of alienation critique. In a modernity in 
which “self-consciousness [has become] infinitely reflected into itself,” alienation, understood by 
Hegel as self-externalization, is constitutive of ethical subjectivity as opposed to the source of its 
deficiency. Quite simply and as our discussion of social need has made clear, for the mature 
                                                 
57 Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Penguin Classics, 1992), 
326–330. 
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Hegel of the Philosophy of Right there simply is no authentic subject from which the laboring 
subject could be estranged from. The ‘mineness’ of all social need and desire, even that of the 
most sinister origin (e.g., profitability for the few), excludes the possibility of ever discovering a 
true desire lying beneath the surface of social appearance as Marx’s alienation critique demands. 
Moreover, while we have not discussed the meaning of labor as spiritual activity as developed in 
the Phenomenology of Spirt, it is worth noting that labor’s significance at that level is precisely 
that of a spiritual self-externalization and alienation that is constitutive of Bildung and subjective 
freedom. Following Avineri, we can say that while for Marx the split between economic and 
political aspects of subjectivity produced by modern industrial labor is “the measure of the 
laborer’s alienation in modern society,” for Hegel this alienation “is the basis of his integration 
into it.”58 Abstract labor for Hegel cannot be a means of Marxian alienation critique, as his view 
of modern human subjectivity excludes even the possibility of an unalienated subjectivity, a 
presupposition upon which Marx’s alienation critique depends.59   
Outside of a narrowly Marxist framework, another common misinterpretation of abstract 
labor takes it as a synonym for what is today called intellectual labor, immaterial labor, or 
cultural labor.60 It should be clear, however, that this too cannot be Hegel’s concept of abstract 
                                                 
58 Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 104n62. 
59 It is for this reason that alienation critique, Marxist or otherwise, is rightly criticized for presupposing a 
true and authentic self or subjectivity from which one becomes alienated. For compelling rearticulation of 
alienation critique that seeks to eliminate this presupposition, see Rahel Jaeggi, Alienation, trans. 
Frederick Neuhouser (Columbia University Press, 2016).  
60 The notion of immaterial labor has been popularized in large part by the work of Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire [Harvard University Press, 2003]; Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form [University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994]), who have in turn drawn on Maurizio Lazzarato’s work in Italy (Maurizio Lazzarato, 
‘‘Immaterial Labor,’’ in Radical Though in Italy, eds. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt [University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996], 133–147). For a sociological perspective on the same tendency towards cultural 
labor in deindustrializing nations, see Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, 
trans. Gregory Elliott (Verso, 2005). 
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labor. For one, the very possibility of machine automation demonstrates that abstract labor 
cannot be another name for intellectual labor, since the latter is by its very nature the kind of 
labor that resists automation so far as its genesis is concerned.61 Second, Hegel explicitly 
contrasts the labor of the culturally educated and intellectual class, i.e., the universal labor of the 
third estate, from the abstract labor of the second estate of trade and industry. Finally, while 
certain kinds of immaterial labor have their place in civil society such as trade and the exchange 
of commodities in the estate of commerce, Hegel sees abstract labor as being chiefly constituted 
by mass manufacturing and craftsmanship (PR §204). It could only be anachronistic to equate 
Hegel’s concept of abstract labor with that of immaterial labor which predominates in our 
contemporary economies.  
The final misunderstanding of abstract labor that we will consider is that of Frederick 
Neuhouser.62 Neuhouser argues that we ought to interpret Hegel’s concept of abstract labor as 
primarily referring to the specific social relations that laborers have with each other in modern 
civil society.63 Furthermore, Neuhouser correctly argues that the social relations of production 
are abstract because they are determined from in principle by the exchange of goods and money 
in the marketplace; abstract labor is undertaken for the satisfaction of the abstract social needs of 
others or need in general as opposed to, say, my own immediate purposes or the commodity’s 
use-value. Thus, in summarizing his view on abstract labor, Neuhouser writes that “the point 
here is not simply that the fruits of one’s labor can in fact be exchanged for the products of 
others but rather that production is carried out with, and determined from the very beginning by, 
                                                 
61 See PR §68 for Hegel’s brief discussion of “intellectual production” in the context of abstract right.  
62 Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 155–165. 
63 Neuhouser writes that abstract labor’s “formative function” and most ethically salient feature “resides 
in a certain way the members of civil society relate to one another, or take each others’ wills into 
account… that the relations individuals have to one another in civil society are abstract” (ibid., 161f). 
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the conscious intention to do so.”64 In other words, labor is abstract when it is undertaken 
primarily for the purposes of exchange (i.e., undertaken for the production of surplus-value 
instead of use-value).   
By understanding abstract labor as describing a particular set of social relations in which 
members see each other exclusively in terms of their abilities as need-satisfiers instead of 
understanding it as describing industrial labor processes, Neuhouser naturally finds nothing 
ethically objectionable about abstract labor. That labor is oriented in the first instance towards 
the valorization of commodity-objects and the satisfaction of market-mediated needs does not 
raise any ethical issues, such as the deadening of the laborer, on its own. However, it is precisely 
its neutrality which proves that the view cannot be Hegel’s. First, while Hegel’s use of the term 
“abstract” indeed intends to capture the structural influence of exchange on the labor process and 
consequently on the Bildung of the laborers, it cannot be reduced to or even summarized by this 
meaning. The issues arising from abstract labor of concern to Hegel are not merely the result of 
wide-scale exchange. Hegel understands abstract labor as instead essentially involving a 
machine-like work process undertaken in atomistic isolation from any kind of intelligible or 
rational end. The individualistic ends realized within the marketplace are only “abstractly” 
universal (PR §208) and without “actual universality” (PR §207A) in part because they lack a 
rational teleology. And, as we have seen, these abstract ends and social needs around which 
production is oriented primarily serve to reproduce these very conditions of exchange and to 
benefit the few who are to profit the most. Abstract labor therefore threatens the Bildung of its 
undertaker both insofar as it forces the laborer to take up physically and spiritually damaging 
processes and insofar as it excludes the possibility of achieving one’s genuinely universal ends, 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 163. 
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two threats to the laborer’s Bildung to which Neuhouser’s view of abstract labor is blind. 
Second, Neuhouser’s interpretation is ultimately inconsistent, or at least in tension, with the 
problematic nature Hegel ascribes to abstract labor. If Hegel really understood abstract labor as 
posing no ethical threats, as principally characterizing the structuring role of exchange without 
the intrusion of any serious ethical concerns, then his insistent concerns over its potential to 
generate wide-spread social pathologies through worker deadening would be unintelligible. For 
Hegel, the deadening of the laborer is not a contingent flaw in the application of abstract labor, 
but inherent within the very logic of abstract labor itself. Thus, just as in the case of poverty, the 
issues arising from abstract labor cannot be mitigated by restrictions and checks imposed 
externally by other social institutions, leaving Hegel with a less pleasant view of abstract labor 
than Neuhouser’s interpretation suggests. For these reasons, we ought to reject Neuhouser’s 
neutral and exchange-based view of abstract labor and adopt the labor-procedural account we 
have been developing here.  
4.2 Bildung and Ethical Subjectivity 
Despite our rejection of Neuhouser’s interpretation of abstract labor, we must agree with 
his insistence on the primacy of its subject-forming aspects in coming to an understanding of 
Hegel’s mature social theory. Hegel calls this subject-formation Bildung, and often talks of its 
“infinite” (PR §187R) and “absolute” (PR §20) value, as well as its “infinite importance” (PR 
§209R). Hegel’s Bildung, however, refers both to the education of the individual over the course 
of her life as well as to the progressive and formative development of society writ large. Put 
simply, Hegel’s Bildung has both subjective and objective components, applying to both the 
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cultivation of subjectivity and the objective institutions responsible for this cultivation.65 
Developing the German philosophical trends of his time,66 Hegel’s notion of Bildung concerns 
not so much institutionalized educational apparatuses and practices (although these are contained 
within it as a part, such as in Hegel’s discussions of the education of children [EM §521; PR 
§§173–175]) as much as the formation of subjectivity in general.67 These ordinary educational 
practices of “child-rearing, upbringing, and school education” are usually addressed by the 
German word Erziehung, not Bildung.68 One can even read the Philosophy of Right as a kind of 
Bildungsroman or coming-of-age story in which the will and its institutional framework are 
progressively enculturated into universality.69 From the perspective of the will, for example, 
Hegel writes that “the particular self-consciousness” achieves substantiality and actuality in the 
state “when this has been raised to its universality” through processes of education (PR §258). 
However, the most important role of Bildung in the Philosophy of Right, I argue, is precisely its 
role in the development of properly ethical subjectivity: the formative processes of the individual 
                                                 
65 Shlomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's Realphilosophie," Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971), 111.  
66 Kristin Gjesdal, “Bildung,” in The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, 
ed. Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal (Oxford University Press, 2015), 710f: “With Hegel… 
Bildung is philosophy, that is, it is identified with the dynamic that leads reason to express and understand 
itself so as to enable its historical and systematic determination, thus realizing, in a grand philosophical 
synthesis, the Fichtean idea that freedom consists in the ability to live up to one’s concept. In this way, 
Hegel, like Herder, links Bildung to an overall historical development, that of the human species.”  
67 Thus Allen Wood writes that “education is not only a prominent but also a fundamental theme in 
Hegel’s philosophy. But perhaps surprisingly in view of his career, Hegel does not usually deal with this 
theme primarily in terms of a theory of pedagogical practice or method” (Allen W. Wood, “Hegel on 
Education,” Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, 1998, 300). See also Wood’s 
discussion of the distinction between Bildung and pedagogy (Pädagogik) in Hegel’s philosophy of 
education (Ibid., 311ff). 
68 Gjesdal, “Bildung,” 695, cf. 697. 
69 For an account of the influence of the German Bildungsroman (especially Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister 
and Hölderlin’s Hyperion) on Hegel’s thought and German Idealism more generally, see, Gjesdal 
“Bildung,” 695–8 and Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (MIT Press, 1971), 
132–44.  
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that shape her beliefs, attitudes, habits, and practices (what Hegel calls her “knowledge, volition, 
and action”) into ones that are ethical and free (PR §187). In short, “education is the art of 
making human beings ethical” (PR §151A).70 
To begin our demonstration of this interpretation, we can first turn to an important 
remark in the introduction to civil society in which Hegel characterizes Bildung as the “absolute 
transition” to ethical subjectivity:  
Education [Bildung], in its absolute determination, is therefore liberation and 
work towards a higher liberation; it is the absolute transition to the infinitely 
subjective substantiality of ethical life, which is no longer immediate and natural, 
but spiritual and at the same time raised to the shape of universality. (PR §187R) 
In raising individuals out of natural immediacy, Bildung is the process by which an 
individual acquires a kind of universality or an ethical substantiality which is “infinitely 
subjective.”71 As we have seen in our discussion of the reflective will, a key part of this infinite 
subjectivity produced by Bildung is the will’s purification of the drives and the “formal 
universality” that this purification confers, about which Hegel explicitly writes that “this 
cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute value of education” (PR §20).72 As the 
concrete and ethical actualization of the purification and socialization of need, civil society thus 
                                                 
70 In this addition attributed to both Hotho and Griesheim, Hegel uses Pädagogik instead of Bildung: “Die 
Pädagogik ist die Kunst, die Menschen sittlich zu machen.” However, the constellation of concepts that 
Hegel is discussing in this context (habit, second nature, the becoming-substance of the spiritual will) 
provide good evidence that this dictum applies just as well to Bildung as it does to Pädagogik. 
71 Knox and Houlgate’s slightly more transparent translation makes it clear the absolute transition 
concerns ethical substantiality which only through the formative processes of Bildung becomes infinitely 
subjective: “education is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and 
natural to the one which is spiritual and infinitely subjective and which has been raised to the shape of 
universality” (Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, 185).  
72 See also: “it is education which vindicates a universal” (§20A, Knox and Houlgate’s translation). Later 
in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel defines Bildung explicitly in terms of this raising of the will’s 
immediate content into the form of conceptuality and universality: “the process of Bildung begins with a 
content whose form is sensuous and immediate and, by means of long and arduous work, arrives at the 
form of thought appropriate to this content and thereby gives it simple and adequate expression” (PR 
§217R). 
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comes to play a fundamental role for Hegel’s conception Bildung. In the context of civil society, 
Bildung encapsulates  
the process whereby [members of civil society’s] individuality and naturalness are 
raised, both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to formal freedom 
and formal universality of knowledge and volition, and subjectivity is educated in 
its particularity.” (PR §187) 
In this second passage, two key features of the Philosophy of Right’s definition of 
Bildung emerge. First, subjectivity is educated in its particularity and not in its universality. It is 
clear that by this Hegel does not mean that the result of education is somehow a form of 
particularity, as this would contradict the raising of need to universality that constitutes Bildung 
in the first place. Instead, subjectivity is educated in its particularity because it is educated 
through its particularity: I obtain my practical education73 not by any explicit concern for the 
universal, but instead through the following of my own particular interests. Thus, Hegel writes 
that this education is unconscious in this sense as the universality acquired is “not present in the 
consciousness of these members of civil society as such” (PR §187). The kind of universalizing 
practical Bildung engendered through the movement of civil society occurs behind the backs of 
its members, “since these persons as such have in their consciousness and their aim not the 
absolute unity, but their own particularity and their being-for-self” (EM §523). 
Second, the universality which the individual acquires through civil society’s educational 
processes is not universality as such but formal universality. In the preceding section, Hegel 
makes clear that this formal universality is a deficient form of universality: “This unity [of the 
principles of particularity and universality] is not that of ethical identity, because at this level of 
division, the two principles are self-sufficient; and for the same reason, it is present not as 
                                                 
73 As discussed below, practical education has a technical meaning for Hegel in which it refers to the kind 
of Bildung produced through laboring in civil society.  
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freedom, but as the necessity whereby the particular must rise to the form of universality and 
seek and find its subsistence in this form” (PR §186). Formal universality appears to the 
individual as necessity, not freedom, and thus cannot be the final word on the rational 
actualization of substantial freedom that Hegel understands himself to be demonstrating in the 
Philosophy of Right. What is left open in this passage, however, is what, precisely, are these 
particulars that rise to formal universality. But, as we have already seen, the particulars that 
Hegel has in mind are the needs of individuals; these are raised to social universality because 
their satisfaction is mediated through labor and abstraction and this mediation thereby confers on 
them objectivity and the “form of universality or of the understanding” since they are now 
systematically integrated into the totality of social need (PR §187R).74 In universalizing social 
need, Bildung also coterminates with the universalization project that is the “end of reason” 
altogether: “[reason’s] end is… to work to eliminate natural simplicity, whether as passive 
selflessness or as barbarism of knowledge and volition – i.e., to eliminate the immediacy and 
individuality in which spirit is immersed, so that this externality may take on the rationality of 
which it is capable” (PR §187R).  
What is still unclear, however, is why this universalization of social need through 
abstraction that Hegel calls Bildung constitutes a formal as opposed to a concrete universality. 
One answer to this question is historical-linguistic. In her discussion of the religious roots of 
Bildung in nineteenth century German philosophy, Kristin Gjesdal points out that Bildung first 
gained a foothold in German philosophy through its theological association with the noun Bild 
                                                 
74 In other words, in civil society particular interests are necessarily universalized, since despite that 
within it “each individual is his own end, and all else means nothing to him… he cannot accomplish the 
full extent of his ends without reference to others… but through its reference to others, the particular end 
takes on the form of universality, and gains satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of 
others” and thus “particularity is tied to the condition of universality” (PR §182R). 
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(image, picture, figure) and the verb bilden (to form, shape, or cultivate).75 Both of these 
etymological siblings of Bildung invoke a sense of formalism, and so it’s no surprise that Hegel, 
the great thinker of the German vernacular, would preserve the formality of whatever is 
described by his conception of Bildung. Thus, in the Encyclopaedia, we find Hegel writing that 
the “habit of abstraction in enjoyment, information, and behavior,” i.e., the ethical disposition 
cultivated in civil society, “constitutes culture [Bildung] in this sphere,—formal culture 
[Bildung] in general” (EM §525). Given its linguistic context, it is difficult to imagine Hegel 
claiming that such a habit counts as material or concrete Bildung. 
However, Hegel invokes more than simple linguistic similarity in his justification of 
Bildung’s formality, although his articulation of this reasoning is somewhat disjointed. We can 
see his argument most clearly by contrasting Bildung’s actualization of “formal freedom” (PR 
§187) with the state’s actualization “concrete freedom”:  
Concrete freedom requires that personal individuality and its particular interests 
should reach their full development and gain recognition of their right for itself 
(within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on 
the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and 
on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as 
their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end. (PR §260) 
In this passage introducing the internal constitution of the state, Hegel emphasizes that 
concrete freedom involves not only the full development of personal individuality and realized 
interests (presumably the result of Bildung), but also (1) the taking of a voluntary and active 
concern for the universal interest and (2) the knowing of this universal interest as an essential part 
of one’s own ethical subjectivity. That is, what concrete freedom requires beyond civil society’s 
formal freedom is the explicit and conscious concomitance of the individual and the general will, 
                                                 
75 Gjesdal, “Bildung,” 698. See also the translator’s note to PR §187R.  
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which, while requiring the processes of Bildung as a part, is not reducible to its processes alone.76 
Bildung is formal, then, because the universal that it raises the market-subject to does not require 
that she “[act] in conscious awareness of this end” (PR §260). Bildung, in other words, fully 
develops the “principle of subjective freedom” (PR §316A) but fails to explicitize this ethical 
subjectivity as a self-consciously grounded in the state—what we may call for the sake of 
dialectical symmetry its failure to develop the ‘principle of objective freedom’. 
That the source of Bildung’s formality lies in its lack of the kind of “substantial unity” 
realized only by the state has several implications for its significance in Hegel’s theory of labor 
and civil society. First, echoing his prior discussion of the formal universality of the reflective 
will (PR §21), Hegel claims that Bildung involves the universalization of natural and immediate 
need into the form of thought, the form of universality, and the form of the understanding (PR 
§217R). Second, Bildung is the becoming-objective of this reflective will: “it is through this 
work of education that the subjective will attains objectivity even within itself” (PR §187R). 
Third and as a result of these two points, Bildung involves the ethical recuperation of self-
externalization and self-alienation inherent not just in nature or the immediate will but in all 
human activity whatsoever (“for in their actions, human beings are necessarily involved in 
externality” [PR §119A]). The goal of Bildung is to sublate this externality “in which spirit is 
immersed” so that “spirit is at home and with itself in this externality as such,” thus 
simultaneously preserving and transcending externality within the modern ethical subject. Thus 
Hegel writes that “the ethical is a subjective disposition”—i.e., the result of the processes of 
                                                 
76 For Hegel, particularity can only preserve itself through its ascent to universality: “This form of 
universality to which particularity has worked its way upwards and cultivated itself, i.e., the form of the 
understanding, ensures at the same time that particularity becomes the genuine being-for-itself of 
individuality; and, since it is from particularity that universality receives both the content which fills it 
and its infinite self-determination, particularity is itself present in ethical life as free subjectivity which as 
infinite being-for-itself” (PR §187R). 
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Bildung—“but of that right which has being in itself”—i.e., a disposition given objective 
existence within an ethical state (PR §141R). Fourth, Bildung as the cultivation of formal 
universality, requires the adherence to and recognition of universal principles. By giving a 
Dasein or existence to the concept of right, Bildung ensures that right is “universally recognized, 
known, and willed, and, in which, through the mediation of this quality of being known and 
willed, it has validity and objective actuality” (PR §209). Finally, as a corollary of Bildung’s 
revelation of the universality and existence of right, Hegel notes (and implicitly affirms civil 
society’s affinity with liberalism) that the Bürger of civil society is treated as a “universal 
person,” i.e., in abstraction from their particular identity: “It is part of education [Bildung]… that 
I am apprehended as a universal person, in which all are identical. A human being counts as such 
because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.” 
(PR §209R). In sum, Bildung’s formality plays many roles in the unfolding of civil society and 
thus is essential for explicating its central role as well as its ethical limitations in Hegel’s social 
theory. 
Both of these two larger features of Bildung as it is developed in the context of modern 
civil society—viz., that practical Bildung’s universality is both unconscious and formal—expose 
a subjective deficiency in civil society. It is for this reason that Hegel characterizes civil society 
as the moment of loss in ethical life, in which ethical subjectivity loses a part of its ethicality: 
civil society is the “system of ethical life, lost in its extremes” of particularity and universality 
(PR §184), it “affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and 
ethical corruption common to both,” (PR §185) and it “particularizes itself abstractly into many 
persons… which, in independent freedom and as particulars, are for themselves… [and] it thus 
initially loses its ethical determination” (EM §523). The key to understanding civil society’s 
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ethical loss is that this loss is the result of the specific kind of Bildung (one of formal 
universality) generated through its reciprocity of needs and labor and that, as a result, this 
deficient Bildung is ultimately the consequence of the processes of abstract labor. While this 
universality marks an important ethical achievement in this sphere, it is also the site of its 
deficiency. Bildung, in other words, is not just the descriptive source of ethical subjectivity, but 
is also the normative juncture at which civil society is ethically evaluated, the rubric under which 
civil society can be shown to be both entirely necessary and utterly insufficient for the 
actualization of social freedom.  
These remarks provide a sketch of Hegel’s theory of Bildung as it pertains to his mature 
political thought at the most general level. However, it is no coincidence that Hegel provides his 
most thorough discussion of Bildung in the Philosophy of Right within his development of civil 
society and the system of needs. As our above exegesis already indicates, Hegel explicitly 
connects labor and Bildung; Bildung’s liberation is always a matter of “hard work” (PR §187) 
and labor always develops a particular shape of subjectivity. Ultimately, we must read labor as 
contributing in a privileged way to the cultivation ethical subjectivity.77 More specifically, 
modern civil society requires that individuals obtain a practical education (praktische Bildung), 
through which they learn to act “in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of 
this continuum” (PR §187) thereby enabling them to mesh with the “arbitrary wills of others” 
(PR §197). Hegel glosses this idea of a practical education as the acquisition of a special habit: 
“the habit of being occupied” (PR §197). 
                                                 
77 Consistent with my thesis but drawing from a different text, Avineri writes that, for Hegel, “labour is 
the universal link among men, 'labour is the universal interaction and education [Bildung] of man… a 
recognition which is mutual, or the highest individuality'. In labour, man becomes 'a universal for the 
other, but so does the other'” (Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 89, citing Hegel, Schriften zur 
Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Georg Lasson [Felix Meiner, 1913], 430 and 428). 
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4.3 Habit, Second Nature, and Practical Education 
It is because of this entanglement with practical education that Hegel’s concept of habit is 
closely related to his concepts of labor and Bildung.78 While the category of habit (EM §§409–
10) is officially developed under the heading of subjective spirit (EM §§387–482), falling within 
the sections on anthropology (EM §§388–412), and thus substantially precedes the sections on 
objective spirt (EM §§483–552), habit plays a central role in Hegel’s account of the “bodiliness” 
and subject-forming aspects of practical Bildung (i.e., “the subjective substantiality of this 
bodiliness”), and, as a consequence, is essential to his account of the ethicality of labor (EM 
§409). The general formula of habit is the becoming-immediate of a universal determination of 
the will—its “being-together-with-one’s-own-self” or its “untroubled being-together-with-itself 
in all the particularity of its content” (EM §410A). Habit describes the subject’s double process 
of denaturalization (that it “makes itself into an abstract universal being”79) and renaturalization 
(that it “reduces the particularity of feelings… to a determination that just is”80) (EM §410).81 
This intensely dialectical nature of habit is celebrated by Hegel, which he admits as “one of the 
most difficult determinations” of the Philosophy of Spirit (EM §410R).82 Nonetheless, Hegel 
                                                 
78 For a detailed account of the centrality of Hegel’s concept of habit in his conception of human 
subjectivity see Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. 
Lisabeth During (Routledge, 2005), 21–76 and passim. A more concise account of habit’s role in the 
Philosophy of Right can be found in Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 75–99.  
79 See also EM §410R: “Habit diminishes this sensation [of thinking], by making the natural 
determination into an immediacy of the soul.” 
80 See also EM §410R: “Habit is the determinacy of feeling (as well as of intelligence, will, etc., in so far 
as they belong to self-feeling) made into something that is nature, mechanical.” 
81 “That the soul thus makes itself into abstract universal being, and reduces the particularity of feelings 
(of consciousness too) to a determination in it that just is, is habit” (EM §410). 
82 See, for example, Hegel’s conclusion to the addition of the final section on habit in which he highlights 
its specifically dialectic nature: “Thus we see, consequently, that in habit our consciousness is at the same 
time present in the matter-in-hand, interested in it, yet conversely absent from it, indifferent towards it; 
that our self just as much appropriates the matter-in-hand as, on the contrary, it withdraws from it, that the 
soul on the one hand completely penetrates into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus 
giving them the shape of something mechanical, of a merely natural effect” (EM §410A). 
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utilizes this notion of habit in the Philosophy of Right to importantly theorize the embodied form 
of subject-formation produced through civil society’s mediation of social need by the process of 
labor (practical education) as well as the immediacy of spiritually-produced freedom achieved in 
ethical life (second nature).  
Hegel develops habit in the Encyclopaedia through three moments: hardening, 
indifference towards satisfaction, and dexterity. By the time habit is developed in the form of 
dexterity, “bodiliness is then rendered pervious, made into an instrument, in such a way that as 
soon as the representation is in me (e.g. a sequence of musical notes), the physical body too, 
unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly” (EM §410R). Dexterity or the “production 
of habit” is obtained by the individual through “practice,” understood as the repetition of the 
“self-incorporation of the particularity of bodiliness of the determinations of feeling into [one’s] 
being” (EM §410). As a consequence of her habituated dexterity, the individual becomes 
liberated from her absorption in sensation or the matter-at-hand, moving within them and 
“without sensation or consciousness,” and thus becomes open to other simultaneous activities, 
and this openness constitutes one aspect of the individual’s freedom in habit (EM §410).83 The 
second aspect of habit’s contribution to subjective freedom is its appropriation of the individual’s 
natural mode of existence, which, in habit, is “reduced to his mere being” (EM §410R). 
Moreover, Hegel makes it clear that habit applies not just to bodily activity such as the human 
being’s upright posture or the act of seeing, but also to thinking itself (he uses the example of 
writing), and goes so far as to say that “habit is the most essential feature of the existence of all 
                                                 
83 “In this way the soul has the content in possession, and contains it in such a way that in such 
determinations it is not actually sentient, it does not stand in relationship to them by distinguishing itself 
from them, nor is it absorbed in them, but it has them in itself and moves in them, without sensation or 
consciousness. The soul is free of them, in so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them; while it 
exists in these forms as its possessions, it is as the same time open to other activity and occupations, in 
the sphere of sensation and the mind’s consciousness in general” (EM §410, emphasis mine). 
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mental life in the individual subject” since it concretizes immediacy not merely “as abstract 
inwardness, cut off from action and actuality,” but rather in the subject’s “very being,” thereby 
translating thought into existence within the individual (EM §410). However, the subject of habit 
is in other respects made unfree. For one, habit takes on what Hegel calls a “relative” form 
which, as in the case of bad habits, can, depending on their content, oppose the actualization of 
freedom.84 Second, habits, by becoming in some sense part of the individual’s natural existence, 
also entail a kind of irreversible desensitization or indifference to that which one is habituated 
and so reduces one’s capacity to react freely. Nevertheless, in the final analysis it is the liberating 
aspects of habit which predominate in the anthropological and social contexts: “the essential 
determination is the liberation from sensation that man gains through habit” (EM §410R). 
It is because of this relative formality that habit recapitulates the same formal 
universality—what Hegel in this context also calls “abstract universality” or the “universality of 
reflection”—that we saw in Bildung and in labor (EM §410). Habit, as “the truth of the 
particular,” produces a subjectivity that becomes “a simple relation of ideality to itself, formal 
universality” and such that it is in habit in which the subject’s self-feeling is “posited as this 
universality… that is for itself” (EM §409).  In virtue of being for-itself, habit’s universality is 
indifferent to the specific determinations of the feelings and drives which constitute self-feeling: 
“this universality is not the content-packed truth of the determinate sensations, desires, etc., for 
their content does not yet come into consideration here” (EM §409). Also like Bildung, habit’s 
universality is unconscious since its “sublation… of the particularity of bodiliness… is the 
                                                 
84 “In habit man’s mode of existence is natural, and for that reason he is unfree in it; but he is free in so far 
as the natural determinacy of sensation is by habit reduced to his mere being, he is no longer different 
from it, is indifferent to it, and so no longer interested, engaged, or dependent with respect to it. This 
unfreedom in habit is partly just formal, pertaining only to the being of the soul; partly only relative, in so 
far as it really arises only in the case of bad habits, or in so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose” 
(EM §410R). 
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entirely pure intuition, unconscious, but the foundation of consciousness” (EM §409R). While 
habit is essential for the operation of thought, it is itself never the explicit object or result of 
conceptual cognition; habit is only ever the object or result of practical activity, in which it will 
always remain unconscious.  
Associated with habit is the notion of a second nature, which appears in the Philosophy of 
Right as an ethical imperative, demanding that we distance ourselves from our immediate, ‘first’ 
nature, and that we produce within ourselves a “second nature” (PR §4; cf PR §151 and PR 
§268A).85 While the category of second nature is underdeveloped in the Philosophy of Right, in 
the Encyclopedia Hegel clarifies its ethical role by explicitly identifying it with habit:  
Habit has rightly been called a second nature: nature, because it is an immediate 
being of the soul, a second nature, because it is an immediacy posited by the soul, 
incorporating and moulding the bodiliness that pertains to the determinations of 
feeling as such and to the determinacies of representation and of the will in so far 
as they are embodied. (EM §410) 
Habit is second nature because it evokes both immediacy (nature) and self-positedness 
(secondness), where this self-positing is the will’s reforming of its own bodiliness and the 
embodiment of its own determinations. Hegel is aware of the standard problem with the idea of 
second nature, which often leaves in lingering ambiguity the implied ‘first nature’ which it 
supersedes. Hegel characterizes this first nature as one in which an individual is determined 
purely by natural immediacy, with no intervention by thought, spirit, or cognition when he 
writes: 
Habit is not an immediate, first nature, dominated by the individuality of 
sensations. It is rather a second nature posited by soul. But all the same it is still a 
nature, something posited that assumes the shape of immediacy, an ideality of 
                                                 
85 Giorgio Cesarale, “Hegel’s Notion of Abstract Labor,” 97. 
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beings that is itself still burdened with the form of being, consequently something 
not corresponding to free mind, something merely anthropological. (EM §410A) 
In this passage, Hegel directly accepts the paradox of second nature by insisting that habit 
both is and is not nature. As we saw in habit’s simultaneous affirmation of freedom and 
unfreedom, second nature refers to both the supersession of the tyranny of sensation and the 
sphere of immediacy or the “form of being” (liberation from the merely anthropological). Second 
nature thus designates a certain kind of freedom that is unconscious, embodied, obtainable only 
through activity, thereby opening an individual to more complex and properly spiritual tasks. 
Habit’s emergence as second nature is crucial for understanding Hegel’s insistence on the 
subjective immediacy of ethical life, that is, the seeming peculiarity that in ethical life “self-
conscious freedom becomes nature” (EM §513) such that this denaturalized/renaturalized 
freedom is actualized “without reflective choice” (EM §514).86 Genuine ethical life must always 
exist in the shape of a habituated and self-produced immediacy, and it is in this form (as opposed 
to that of a purely reflective kind) that Hegel privileges in his account of ethical life’s 
actualization of freedom: “the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of 
spirit produced from within itself as a second nature” (PR §4). Hegel reiterates this point later, 
writing that “the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the 
original and purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, significance, and actuality of 
individual existence (PR §151).  
The ethical centrality of this peculiar mediated immediacy that is habit/second nature 
arises most prominently in Hegel’s defense of patriotism as the “political disposition” most 
appropriate for, and grounded on the truth of, the state: 
                                                 
86 Hegel also characterizes the realization of ethical life as second nature as the unity of the concept of the 
will with its existence as an individual will: “Ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will 
of the individual” (PR §33A). 
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The political disposition, i.e. patriotism in general, is certainty based on truth and 
volition which has become habitual. This disposition is in general… the 
consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and 
contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and… as a 
result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my 
consciousness of this, I am free. (PR §268) 
Membership in an ethical state is, on its own, not enough for securing freedom; nor is a 
merely reflective acknowledgement of the state’s universality. I am subjectively free only by 
means of having a particular habit, patriotism, which must be grounded on the truth, i.e., the 
objectively existing state. This political disposition requires not only that I cognitively recognize 
my particular interests as realized only within that of the universal, not based on the truth of this 
realization alone, but in which this recognition is embodied and cultivated through practical 
activity and labor as an immediate ethical nature or life, the outcome of which is practical 
Bildung.  
Returning to the notion of practical education, we will recall that the practical Bildung 
acquired through labor in civil society manifests itself in the individual’s “habit of abstraction” 
(EM §525), “habit of being occupied” (PR §197), or “habit of right in general, of the ethical” 
(EM §410R). This habit has the form of universality, on the one hand, and “the content of 
freedom,” on the other (EM §410R). 
Hegel distinguishes the practical education obtained in civil society from “theoretical 
education,” which “involves not only a variety of representations and items of knowledge, but 
also an ability to form such representations and pass from one to the other in a rapid and versatile 
manner, to grasp complex and general relations, etc.”—in other words, theoretical education 
encompasses all the usual aims of traditional education: an individual’s capacity to think 
critically, draw on a broad body of knowledge, and communicate with others (and hence 
theoretical education “also includes language”) (PR §197). While Hegel is not explicit on this 
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point, he likely assumes that theoretical education is the concern of the standard institutions we 
often refer to by the word education (primary and secondary education, and so on). 
Practical education, on the other hand, is the institutional concern and product of civil 
society. Rather than cultivating the intellect’s understanding, practical education produces the 
habit of being active or, as Ruda puts it, the habit of having habits:87  
Practical education through work consists in the self-perpetuating need and habit 
of being occupied in one way or another, in the limitation of one’s activity to suit 
both the nature of the material in question and, in particular, the arbitrary will of 
others, and in a habit, acquired through this discipline, of objective activity and 
universally applicable skills. (PR §197) 
Practical education is not the formation of any and all habits, however, but the habits that 
have the kind of objectivity gained through the mediating processes of the system of needs, i.e., 
the habit of practical education must be one of contributing to the satisfaction of the needs of 
others, it must be socially necessary. As Hegel states in the addition, practical education entails 
both a degree of objective success in one’s manipulating the material in question as well as a 
subjective lack of resistance, for example, in the arbitrary will of others, in achieving one’s ends: 
“A worker can be described as skilled if he produces the thing as it ought to be, and if, in his 
subjective actions, he encounters no resistance to the end he is pursing” (PR §197). This skill 
requirement can only be satisfied through specialization in one sphere of labor, so, in turn, 
practical education also requires that everyone join an estate: “the individual attains actuality 
only by entering into existence in general, and hence into determinate particularity; he must 
accordingly limit himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need” (PR §207). Thus, 
while civil society’s contribution to the actualization of freedom demands that everyone obtain 
practical Bildung, a habit of having habits, the exact content of this Bildung is both limited by the 
                                                 
87 Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 107. 
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requirement that these habits satisfy the social needs of others but otherwise indeterminate, 
differing depending upon the estate that the individual belongs to, since the estates are 
differentiated according to “their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, 
variety of labor, and theoretical and practical education” (PR §201; cf. EM §527).  
One key implication of this conception of practical Bildung is that while all labor and all 
human activity produce habits and contribute to the construction of one’s second nature (hence 
the possibility of bad habits and their characterization as relative and formal universities), not all 
of these habits are adequate to the concept of true ethical life or, in other words, are normatively 
desirable from the perspective of the actualization of social freedom. While Hegel clearly 
theorizes a plurality of such ethical subjectivities in the diversity of his three estates—indeed, a 
necessary and immanent plurality and differentiation given that any “organic whole” must be 
“composed of different elements” (PR §200R)—the habituated second nature produced by the 
Bürger’s labor must fall within a relatively narrow range if it is to be ethical: she must satisfy the 
needs of others in a socially necessary way through labor, she must acquire skill in manipulating 
her object, she must habituate herself to and therefore embody herself in this active labor, and 
she must, by doing all of this, come to unconsciously reconcile her own particular interests and 
volition with those of the universal, society writ large.88 To fail at any one of these tasks is to fail 
at actualizing practical Bildung and thus also to construct a deficiency in the center of social 
freedom itself, which, by way of Hegel’s logic of actuality, requires not the mere existence of 
practical Bildung but its actualization through its unification of universality and particularity.89 
                                                 
88 It is precisely the coterminance of the principle of subjectivity or the interests of the individuals with 
the collective interests of the state that ensure its strength and stability (PR §265A). 
89 Hegel makes this argument with the ethical evaluation of an empirical state, but it can also be made 
analogously for any constituent aspect of this totality. If we take up any given empirical state, then it may 
very well be, as Hegel puts it, a “bad state” which is purely finite or existent (Existenz) as opposed to an 
 
   
50 
To summarize, we can say that civil society contributes to ethicality or the actualization 
of social freedom through its development of practical Bildung or habitual ethical subjectivity, 
and that this practical Bildung is in turn the subjective result of civil society’s labor, which, in 
contrast to other kinds of labor throughout Hegel’s writings, “links selfishness with the 
universal” (PR §201A). It is for this reason that Anders Bartonek is correct in pointing out that 
civil society’s labor in its educational role simultaneously transcends and preserves its function 
as an economic category and is the true locus of Hegel’s ethical concerns about labor in the 
Philosophy of Right. Hegel’s philosophy of labour, Bartonek writes, is one of a “cultivating 
Bildung” as a “theory of the human self as a product of its labour,” and thus necessarily “is a 
form of labour that transcends the mere economic scope of labour.”90 It is precisely labor’s 
subject-forming powers, theorized by Hegel through habit and Bildung, that justifies the central 
importance of labor in the system of needs and in ethical life in general and that provides some 
rough criteria for distinguishing between those ethical subjectivities adequate to ethical living 
(and thus too the labor processes responsible for them) from those which do not.  
  
                                                 
ethical state which is “infinite within itself” or actual (PR §270A). “Actuality is always the unity and 
particularity, the resolution of universality into particularity; the latter then appears to be self-sufficient, 
although it is sustained and supported only by the whole. If this unity is not present, nothing can be 
actual, even if it may be assumed to have existence. A bad state is one which merely exists… but it has no 
actuality” (PR §270A). Thus, like the bad state, a bad Bildung would not be the inexistence of education 
but rather an education which fails to unify universality and particularity and thus is not an actualized 
education (and consequently does not contribute to the actualization of freedom). 
90 Bartonek, “Labour Against Capitalism?,” 117. 
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5 THE PROBLEM OF ABSTRACT LABOR AND THE SOLUTION OF MACHINE 
AUTOMATION 
So far, we have seen how labor, as the source of the Bürger’s practical Bildung and habitual 
second nature, is the central locus of civil society’s ethicality. We have also seen how abstract 
labor characterizes a specific labor processes associated with modern factory production, and 
that this process leads to the deadening of the laborer’s ethical subjectivity as opposed to its 
development. However, two questions still linger unaddressed. First, exactly how is abstract 
labor responsible for the deadening of the laborer in a way that is so problematic for practical 
Bildung? What about the mechanistic labor makes it so deadening, so antithetical to ethical 
subject-formation? Second, how does Hegel’s purposed solution—the use of machines to 
automate abstract labor and thus eliminate its necessity—actually solve the problem of 
Abstumpfung given, on the hand, the ethical requirement of laboring for the actualization of 
one’s freedom, and, on the other hand, the various impasses he identifies for any intervention 
into the autonomous sphere of civil society? In asking these two questions, we must now shift 
our focus away from Hegel’s description of the functioning of civil society to the more 
evaluative and normative dimensions of this aspect of his social theory. 
5.1 The Problem of Abstract Labor: The Abstumpfung of the Laborer 
Let us turn to our first question: what are, and what are the sources of, the deadening effects 
on subject-formation produced by mechanized abstract labor found in modern factories, 
according to Hegel? Although this question appears to be straightforward one, and despite 
having many of its central theoretical elements in place in his conceptual development of 
Bildung and habit, Hegel does not deliver an explicit connection of these deadening effects with 
industrial labor within the text of the Philosophy of Right—such an account must be 
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reconstructed. Although it is tempting to see a statement of these damages in Hegel’s discussions 
of poverty and the rabble (PR §§241–246), we ought to resist such a reading. The problem with 
allowing Hegel’s general remarks about poverty and the rabble to stand in as a discussion of 
abstract labor’s Abstumpfung is that Hegel rigorously distinguishes between these three groups, 
i.e., between the poor, the rabble, and the industrial workforce. What Hegel says about the 
rebellious disposition of the unemployed and indignant rabble, for example, does not apply to the 
poor or to the factory workers (as it is precisely this anti-ethical subjective attitude that uniquely 
identifies the rabble). Likewise, not all of the employed poor will find themselves occupied in 
abstract factory labor, such as the peasantry. And, finally, Hegel is aware that some factory 
workers are paid quite well, putting them squarely outside the realm of poverty.91 Thus, when 
Hegel writes that some of those involved in “particular work” are cut off from the full freedom 
offered by modern civil society, he is not directly addressing the deadening produced by abstract 
labor:  
When the activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with 
expanding its population and industry. – On the one hand… the accumulation of 
wealth increases. … But on the other hand, the specialization and limitation of 
particular work also increase, as do likewise the dependence and want of the class 
[Klasse] which is tied to such work; this in turn leads to an inability to feel and 
enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil 
society. (PR §243)92 
                                                 
91 For example, in his 1817–1818 Heidelberg lectures Hegel explicitly mentions England as a country in 
which some factory laborers are well-paid and thus not members of the poor: “A factory can thrive in a 
country where there is great poverty and people have to make do with little; but in England the cost of 
labor is exceedingly high, and yet the factories prosper” (Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political 
Science: The First Philosophy of Right, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson [University of 
California Press, 1995], 177) 
92 “When civil society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in 
population and industry. […] The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular work. This 
results in the dependence and distress of the class [Klasse] tied to work of that sort, and these again entail 
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Looking carefully at the problems emphasized in this passage, we see that none of them are quite 
the same as the deadening subjectivity induced by abstract labor. My inability to participate in 
the “wider freedoms” and “spiritual advantages” of civil society is not due to the specific 
character of my labor activity per se, of its “specialization and limitation” itself. Rather, its real 
cause is my complete dependence on wage labor93 and my economic impoverishment resulting 
from the large-scale social organization of labor and the distribution of its output.94 Hegel’s use 
Klasse instead of Stand to describe these workers signifies that he is here describing abstract 
labor as such as not merely divided labor, and so this dependence-distress is concerns only the 
former. The quality of my labor itself has yet to come into play; we must look elsewhere for an 
account of abstract labor’s contribution to Abstumpfung.  
Given Hegel offers no explicit account of the origin and meaning of the abstract laborer’s 
deadening, my contention is that we can reconstruct it by firstly looking at Hegel’s remarks on 
Abstumpfung in his early Jena manuscripts and his later lectures on the Philosophy of Right and 
secondly by reviewing his critique of the mechanistic view of the state which provides an 
analogy to his less explicit critique of mechanized labor. These two sources show us that 
Abstumpfung, for Hegel, is simply what happens when the laborer fails to acquire practical 
Bildung, and has its origin in her inability to participate in the labor process as a differentiated 
organ within a rationally ordered whole.  
                                                 
the inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the spiritual benefits of civil society” 
(Houlgate and Knox, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, 220f). 
93 Marx would later theorize this dependency as the formal subsumption of labor under capital (Marx, 
Capital, 645f, 1019–1038, cf. also the chapters on primitive accumulation, 873–931). 
94 Houlgate and Knox’s translation more explicitly constructs the causal chain that I am asserting here. 
They make it clear that the dependence and poverty of the workers “entail” their inability to enjoy the 
spiritual benefits of civil society.  
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Already in his early Jena writings, Hegel is centrally concerned with the subjective 
effects of modern manufacturing on the emerging laboring Klasse.95 In the Jena manuscript of 
1803–1804, Hegel writes of the “vengeance” of abstract labor, noting that this new form of labor 
invokes a dialectic inversion of the Promethean subjugation of nature though labor. Through the 
technologically mediated consummation of humanity’s domination over nature, the laborer now 
finds himself in a world in which “the more he takes from nature, the more he subjugates it” 
through modern techniques of production, “the baser he becomes himself.”96 In this kind of 
industrialized factory labor, Hegel continues, “the human being becomes more and more 
machine-like, dull, spiritless” to the point that “the spiritual element, the self-conscious 
plentitude of life, becomes empty activity.” Hegel makes much the same point in his 1805–1806 
Jena manuscript, where he writes that in the factory “man’s labor itself becomes entirely 
mechanical… but the more abstract [his labor] becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract 
activity.”97 The factory laborer loses part of his “rich comprehension,” and instead “his dull work 
limits him to one point.98 Thus, with the advent of abstract labor, the 1803–1804 manuscript 
concludes:  
                                                 
95 Throughout all of his writings, Hegel reserves the modern term Klasse solely for this new demographic 
of urban laborers rather than his usual Stand for discussing the estates. Only the estates receive official 
representation within the state’s political constitution (Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 
149n49).  
96 Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie I (1803–1804), ed. J. Hoffmeister (Felix Meiner Verlag, 1930), 237, 
quoted and translated in PR 444n1. A complete English translation of this manuscript has been published 
under the title “First Philosophy of Spirit: Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803–1804” in 
Hegel, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H. S. Harris and T.M. Knox (State 
University of New York Press, 1979), 247. 
97 Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, 121 
98 Hegel, Jenaer Realphilosophie [1805–1806], ed. J. Hoffmeister [Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969], 232, 
quoted and translated in PR 444n1). This manuscript has been translated as “Hegel and the Human Spirit” 
in Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. Leo Rauch (Wayne State University Press, 1983), 139. 
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Work thus becomes absolutely more and more dead, it becomes machine-labor, 
the individual’s own skill becomes infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the 
factory worker is degraded to the utmost level of dullness.”99  
Moreover, in his earliest known social-theoretic writings from 1802, Hegel writes that 
“deadening” of labor occurs when it becomes “more mechanical, because variety is excluded 
from it and so it becomes itself something more universal, more foreign to [the living] whole.100 
Lastly, in the 1805–06 manuscript Hegel even recognizes the essential precarity and thus latent 
poverty of the factory worker:  
In the individual’s skill is the possibility of sustaining his existence. This is 
subject to all the tangled and complex contingency in the [social] whole. Thus a 
vast number of people are condemned to a labor that is totally stupefying, 
unhealthy and unsafe—in workshops, factories, mines, etc.—shrinking their 
skills. And entire branches of industry, which supported a large class of people, 
go dry all at once because of [changes in] fashion or a fall in prices due to 
inventions in other countries, etc.—and this huge population is throw into helpless 
poverty.101 
In these various passages from his Jena period, Hegel states, consistently with his theory of 
Bildung, that abstract labor is responsible for forming a specific kind of laborer-subject, namely 
one whose life has been deadened through repetitive labor, whose practical activity has become 
empty, and whose integration within the organic whole has been irrevocably lost. Insofar as the 
abstract laborer is involved in machine-like labor, she herself becomes “baser” and “dull,” and 
her self-conception “degraded” and “one-sided.” In addition, the abstract laborer cannot be held 
responsible for her own deadening, as her lot is not chosen but the blind result of a complex web 
                                                 
99 Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie I (First Philosophy of Spirit), 323f, quoted and translated in Avineri, 
Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 93. 
100 Hegel, System of Ethical Life, 117f, bracketed text is the translator’s.  
101 Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, 139f.  
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of contingencies, both on the subjective side of her natural proclivities, upbringing, and course of 
life as well as on the objective side of world-market’s volatility.102 
 These themes of subjective depravity as a result of abstract labor are repeated in Hegel’s 
later lectures on the Philosophy of Right in Heidelberg and Berlin. In the former, Hegel writes 
that “a factory presents a sad picture of the deadening of human beings” and, most importantly, 
paints this deadening as a broad degeneracy of their ethical subjectivity: “which is also why on 
Sundays factory workers lose no time in spending and squandering their entirely weekly 
wages.”103 Much is the same in his many lectures on the Philosophy of Right in Berlin, where 
Hegel can be found claiming, for example, that “the more developed the division of labor is, the 
more spiritless and dull it becomes” (VPR I, 31) and “that through the perfection of labor, [labor] 
dulls the workers… it is only the work of the understanding which is thus cultivated, modified” 
(VPR IV, 503).105 Thus, throughout the entirety of Hegel’s social and political thought (although 
certainty less explicit in the Philosophy of Right) lies the central insight that the tendency toward 
abstract labor in modern civil society leads to the deadening of the very subject-formation that it 
is supposed to bring about; its essential contribution to free and ethical living turns out to be, for 
factory workers at least, its generation of unfreedom. The abstract laborer does not cultivate 
herself through her labor, but rather becomes narrow-sighted, spiritless, and deadened, unable to 
conceive of herself as a properly ethical agent. 
 These various remarks on Abstumpfung are, however, just that—remarks. They still bear 
the mark of their original purpose as lecture notes, and, as such, have yet to be systematically 
connected by Hegel with the rest of his social theory. They state clearly that factory labor 
                                                 
102 See also Hegel’s characterization of labor as requiring “continual strict dominancy and taming like a 
wild beast” (Hegel, First Philosophy of Spirit, 249). 
103 Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, p. 177 
105 Quoted and translated in Waszek, “The Division of Labor,” 72n126. 
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deadens the worker, and that this deadening is a truncation of the laborer’s Bildung. However, 
they leave open the question of why this labor is deadening, and thus falsely make Hegel’s 
criticism of factory labor appear similar to something like alienation critique. The issue with 
abstract factory labor is not that it is divided labor, i.e., that it requires worker specialization and 
limitation in one’s activity and, as a consequence of this, separates the laborer from the final 
product and the circumstances of its use and produces inequalities of pay, activity, recognition, 
and so on. If this were so, then it would be nearly the whole of civil society that found itself 
undertaking empty and machine-like activity. Instead, the key to the difference between socially 
necessary divided labor and anti-ethical abstract factory labor as such is the latter’s character as 
machine-like and mechanistic, which is not at all a necessity in the general division of labor and 
is conceptually distinct from the laborer’s alienation. But we get no account of mechanism in the 
Philosophy of Right, not even a reference to its development as a category in the logic. However, 
we do get some remarks on mechanistic approaches to the state, and how these differ from 
Hegel’s organismic approach, which, once pieced together and then juxtaposed with his lecture 
comments on Abstumpfung and his theory of Bildung, provide a sufficient understanding of 
mechanism for explicating abstract labor’s deadening of the worker.107  
                                                 
107 For a book-length treatment of the role of mechanism in Hegel’s social theory, see Nathan Ross, On 
Mechanism in Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge, 2008), see also Sally Sedgwick, “The 
State as Organism: The Metaphysical Basis of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 39, no. S1 (2001): 171–88 and Michael Quante, “‘Organic Unity’: Its Loose and Analogical 
and Its Strict and Systematic Sense in Hegel’s Philosophy,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 
S1 (2001): 189–95. While Ross argues that civil society realizes the category of absolute mechanism, not 
teleology, both Quante and Sedgwick agree that the state is in some sense an organic unity (i.e., has an 
internal teleology), despite disagreeing among themselves about the systematicity of this notion.  
However, all three agree that the state is unified as a “‘rational whole,’ a system of objects that is able to 
sustain itself through its own conceptual self-determination” and it is this feature of self-determination 
which I seek to contrast with mechanistic labor (Ross, On Mechanism, 127). 
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 There are few views of the state that Hegel criticizes more vehemently than the that which 
conceives of the state as a mechanism solely for preserving private self-interests, enforcing 
abstract rights, and protecting private property (PR xvi). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
characterizes the mechanistic conception of the state as:  
That representation of the state according to which its sole determination is to 
protect and secure the life, property, and arbitrary will of everyone, in so far as the 
latter does not infringe the life, property, and arbitrary will of others; in this view, 
the state is merely an arrangement dictated by necessity. (PR §270R, translation 
modified) 
While the mechanistic state’s protection of formal liberties is an important aspect of the ethical 
state, the mechanistic conception of the state mistakes civil society as the ethical state as such, 
and it likewise mistakes formal freedom as substantial freedom. It places “beyond the state” the 
sort of actualized freedom that is supposed to be realized by the intersubjective social 
collective—“the higher spiritual element of what is true in and for itself”—and thus the concept 
of the state becomes “completely deprived of its proper ethical character” (PR §270R). Such is 
the state conceived as an external mechanism for the preservation of private property. But “the 
state is an organism”—not a machine—Hegel asserts (PR §269A). The intelligibility of all of 
Hegel’s theory of the modern state depends upon this distinction, but for our purposes it suffices 
to focus on the two important junctures in the Philosophy of Right where Hegel explicitly 
contrasts the mechanistic state from the organic and rational one: first, in specifying the intimate 
relationship between the state and the political disposition of its citizenry and, second, in 
defending his view of the division of political powers across the governmental branches of the 
executive, the legislature, and the monarchy (what Hegel calls the “internal constitution” of the 
state). 
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 As we have seen, patriotism or political disposition is the subjective correlate of the state’s 
objective institutions and refers to a specific kind of habit in which “in the normal conditions and 
circumstances of life, [one] habitually knows that the community is the substantial basis and end 
[of oneself]” (PR §268R). This habit, I have argued, is the combined result of the practical 
Bildung obtained by laboring in civil society and the theoretical Bildung acquired through 
traditional education. Since an essential component of this habit is the integration of my own 
particular interests and subjective freedom within the universal interests and actuality of the 
state, it provides a particularly colorful example of the kind of organically unified totality that is 
missing in abstract factory labor.   
 In his long remark contrasting the state from the church, Hegel notes that both of these 
institutions, in a certain sense, contain “doctrine” insofar as each requires the codification of 
“whatever it recognizes as valid” into the “form of thought as law” (PR §270R). Moreover, 
Hegel continues, these two doctrines can, and often do, come into conflict with one another, 
since, on the one hand, the doctrine of the church cannot be a merely “internal matter” of 
conscience—as if it were completely independent of the material and ethical concerns of the 
state—because this internal matter of conscience “is in fact an expression… of a content which is 
intimately connected, or even directly concerned, with ethical principles and the laws of the 
state” (PR §270R). On the other hand, the state, understood as an organism and not a machine, 
must concern itself with the subjective disposition of its citoyens:  
Since the state is not a mechanism but the rational life of self-conscious freedom 
and the system of the ethical world, the disposition, and so also the consciousness 
of this disposition in principles, is an essential moment in the actual state. (PR 
§270R) 
Thus, the church and the state both make claims on the internal subjectivity of their constituents 
and these claims may collide. (While Hegel does not mention civil society in this context—he 
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instead considers the possibility of an independent scientific community colliding with the 
state—we could also say the same about its status as an independent social institution and its 
exclusive claim to molding the subjectivity of the Bürger.) Of course, for Hegel, the state must 
triumph in this conflict as it is only through it that ethicality is actualized.108 However, what is 
more important for our purposes is to see that it is precisely the state’s sensitivity to and 
responsibility for developing the ethical disposition of its citizens that makes it count as “not a 
mechanism.” Moreover, this disposition is, crucially, self-conscious and grounded in intelligible 
and rationally organized principles. The rational state’s incorporation of its members’ 
subjectivities in its own actuality starkly contrasts it from the state qua mechanism that remains 
external and indifferent to these subjective inner-workings, concerned only with the protection of 
the formal liberties of all, which in actuality reduces to the substantial freedom of the few.109  
 We find a similar characterization of mechanism in Hegel’s discussion of the division of 
political powers, although by quite a different path. In this context, Hegel insists that the 
separation of political power among the executive, legislative, and monarchical branches of 
government cannot be one of competing interests and competition, i.e., it cannot be based on the 
model of civil society. Such a differentiation without explicit interconnection and unity is unfit 
for the rational state:  
                                                 
108 Further on in the remark Hegel reminds us that the Philosophy of Right has already “established the 
truth [of the proposition] that spirit, as free and rational, is inherently ethical, that the true Idea is actual 
rationality, and that it is this rationality which exists as the state” (PR §270R). 
109 Hegel associates the mechanistic view of the state with the English and harbors no illusions that these 
protections serve the substantial freedom of the many: “Take the case of England which, because private 
persons have a predominate participation in state affairs, has been regarded as having the freest of all 
constitutions. Experience shows that this country—as compared with the other culturally advanced states 
of Europe—is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation, in the right and the freedom of 
property, in arrangements for art and science, etc., and that objective freedom i.e. rational right, is rather 
sacrificed to formal right and to particular private interest” (EM §544R).  
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The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates and determines its 
activity within itself in accordance with the nature of the concept. It does so in 
such a way that each of the powers in question is in itself the totality, since each 
contains the other moments and has them active within it, and since all of them, as 
expressions of the differentiation of the concept, remain wholly within its ideality 
and constitute nothing but a single individual whole. (PR §272).110 
Since the very notion of a state requires that its constitutive powers work in unity with and for 
each other, the mechanistic state does not, strictly speaking, exist. If state politics become 
nothing more than “means of coercion” for individual or group private interests, then the state 
has already dissolved:  
there would no longer be any government, only parties, and the only remedy for it 
would be the domination and suppression of one party by the other. To represent 
organization of the state as a mere intellectual constitution, i.e., as the mechanism 
of a balance of powers external to each other in their interior, goes against the 
fundamental Idea of what a state is. (EM §544R) 
For Hegel, such a dissolution of the state through mechanization is realized in history by the 
despotic feudal monarchies, which, by striving for power and committing acts of violence, 
present not a sequence of ethical states but a “succession of rebellions” (PR §286R). The 
violence and instability of the medieval polis, Hegel argues, is the result of its mechanical 
separation, as opposed to organic differentiation-integration, of political power:  
The reason for this is that, in conditions such as these, the division of political 
business is purely mechanical, with its different parts distributed among vassals, 
pashas, etc., so that the difference [between these elements] is not one of 
determination and form, but merely of greater or lesser power. Thus, each part 
maintains itself alone, and in so doing, it promotes only itself and not the others 
along with it, and has within itself the complete set of moments which it requires 
for independence and self-sufficiency. In an organic relationship, the units in 
question are not parts but members, and each maintains the others while fulfilling 
                                                 
110 See also PR §286: “Each member [of the whole], in maintaining itself independently, thereby also 
maintains the others in their own distinct character within the rational organism.” 
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its own function; the substantial end and product of each is to maintain the other 
members while simultaneously maintaining itself. (PR §286R)111 
Following Hegel’s contrast in this passage between organic relation and mechanical division, we 
can say that in the former the well-being of each component part is preserved in the functioning 
of the whole despite its specialization: success or failure in the wider telos is reflected in each, 
and no component can be left to degrade or perish—it is the tide that really lifts all boats. As a 
result of this unity, there is a fluid reciprocity between each element despite their specialization. 
Moreover, since each is “in itself the totality,” all of the components participate both in the 
determining of the organism’s ends as well as an instrument in its proper functioning. 
Although Hegel’s critique of the mechanistic conception of the state has no direct bearing 
on abstract labor per se, it provides a helpful analogy for explaining the way in which abstract 
factory labor deadens the worker. If we combine these insights with those of Hegel’s lectures and 
our previous treatment of his theory of Bildung, we arrive at a reconstruction of what is wrong 
with abstract labor, and, more importantly, an idea of the forms of labor which would avoid these 
pitfalls. Putting the issue negatively, we can say that abstract factory labor deadens the laborer 
because: through the labor process, the laborers are sacrificed, not preserved; the laborers do not 
participate in ends-setting, only the holders of capital do (and even they are subject to the profit 
motive); the laborers are not conscious of the rational principles which organize their activity; 
the laborers do not acquire security in their social station or stability in their financial situation; 
there is no guarantee that their labor is actually socially necessary; and, finally, the laborers are 
not integrated into the universality of the state, they exist as mere accidents of it, since their work 
has stifled their physical and intellectual capacities and so too their substantial freedom.  
                                                 
111 See also PR §300A: “The representation of the so-called independence of powers contains the basic 
error that the powers should be independent yet mutually limiting. If they are independent, however, the 
unity of the state, which is the supreme requirement, is destroyed.” (PR §300A, see also §301A). 
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5.2  Hegel’s Solution to the Problem of Abstract Labor: Machine Automation 
Nearly all of Hegel’s discussions of the deadening caused by abstract labor are 
immediately followed by the consolation that the very principles governing civil society which 
give rise to this regrettable process of mechanical labor also tend towards its dissolution through 
machine automation.114 In his Jena writings, for example, we find Hegel claiming that  
this deadening of mechanical labor directly implies the possibility of cutting 
oneself off from it altogether; for the labor here is wholly quantitative without 
variety, and since its subsumption in intelligence is self-cancelling, something 
absolutely external, a thing, can then be used owing to its self-sameness both in 
respect of its labor and its movement. It is only a question of finding for it an 
equally dead principle of movement, a self-differentiating power of nature like the 
movement of water, wind, stream, etc., and the tool passes over into the 
machine.115 
And again in 1805–1806:  
Man’s labor itself becomes entirely mechanical… and consequently he is in a 
position to withdraw himself from labor and to substitute for his own activity that 
of an external nature. He needs more motion, and this he finds in external nature. 
In other words, pure motion is precisely the relation of the abstract forms of space 
and time—the abstract external activity, the machine. (Hegel and Human Spirit, 
121)  
The redemptive character of machine automation is even more emphasized in his 1806–1807 
Heidelberg lectures:  
A factory presents a sad picture of the deadening of human beings… But once 
factory work has reached a certain degree of perfection, of simplification, 
mechanical human labor can be replaced by the work of machines, and this is 
what usually comes about in factories. In this way, through the consummation of 
this mechanical progress, human freedom is restored… Human beings are 
                                                 
114 Waszek rightly notes that the idea of machine automation “re-occurs frequently in Hegel’s writings, 
both earlier and later” (Waszek, “The Division of Labor,” 73). 
115 Hegel, System of Ethical Life, 117f.  
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accordingly first sacrificed, after which they emerge through the more highly 
mechanized conditions as free once more.116 
The preparation of specific means calls for a particular aptitude and familiarity, 
and individuals must confine themselves to only one of these. This gives rise to 
the division of labor, as a result of which labor or work becomes less concrete in 
character, becomes abstract, homogeneous, and easier, so that a far greater 
quantity of products can be prepared in the same time. In the final stage of 
abstractness, the homogeneity of labor makes it mechanical, and it becomes 
possible to install machines in the place of people, replacing human motion by a 
principle of natural motion that is harnessed to secure uniformity and to promote 
human ends.117 
Just as in the case of Abstumpfung, the corresponding claims about machine automation 
in Hegel’s more mature political writings are less grandiose. The first comes from the last 
sentence of §198 in the Philosophy of Right: “The abstraction of production makes work 
increasingly mechanical, so that the human being is eventually able to step aside and let a 
machine take his place.” The same idea is presented in an extended but similar way in the 
1824/25 lectures, in which Hegel claims that the “further consequence” of the mechanization of 
labor “is that man can finally leave it to machines.” His lecture claim is slightly stronger, as there 
the “perfection of labor” not only enables but requires automation that “in the end makes man 
superfluous,” such that civil society tends towards the elimination of harmful abstract labor 
(VPR IV, 503f). Nonetheless, in all of his later presentations of machine automation, Hegel only 
hints as the redemptive capacity of machine automation and is perhaps less optimistic about the 
degree of its uptake in actually existing factories. What is constant throughout all presentations, 
though, is machine automation’s privileged role as the solution to abstract labor.  
                                                 
116 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, 117. 
117 Ibid., 175. 
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We can now turn to our second question: If Hegel understood the deadening effects of 
abstract labor so acutely, what kind of reconciliation do they receive in his mature theory of the 
state? An adequate answer to this kind of question has long puzzled commentators of the 
Philosophy of Right, who have often wondered whether Hegel adequately replies to the very 
threats to ethical life he identifies within civil society.118 The question of whether Hegel’s hope 
for machine automation is consistent is a subset of this larger issue. Machine automation is 
Hegel’s response to one particular threat of civil society: the deadening effect associated with 
abstract labor and the new kind of deformed subjectivity it produces. A successful reply to such 
critics would require as a component an adequate reconciliation of these two phenomena.  
Part of Hegel’s response to the subject-formation problems of abstract labor involves 
reference to the larger societal structures and institutions outside of the labor process itself. This 
is Hegel’s systematic response, in which he leans on the regulative practices of the police and 
corporations and the recognitive and unifying practices of the state in order to remedy the ills 
produced by the system of needs. The general argumentative strategy is to admit that abstract 
labor opposes the actualization of freedom in the lives of workers if such labor is conceived only 
within the narrow sphere of the marketplace. However, the argument continues, looking out from 
the global and unified perspective of the state we recognize that abstract labor is in fact not 
merely a necessary evil but instead a constitutive element of our freedom in some way or 
another. Hegel’s model for this kind of systematic is his defense of the state’s engagement in 
war, involving the individual’s sacrifice of security in life and property receives a “higher 
significance” recognizable only from outside the sphere of civil society—namely, from the more 
                                                 
118 For example, Wood argues that the corporations are Hegel’s solution to poverty while Avineri argues 
that Hegel offers no solution to the problem of poverty (Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 237–255; 
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State Modern State, 109 and 143–154).  
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complete and universal perspective of the state (PR §324R). Analogously, by taking herself to be 
in the first instance a citizen of a rational state (as opposed to a satisfier of needs), the abstract 
factory laborer could come to see her dull labor as an acceptable political practice aligned with 
the realization of her substantial freedom. 
Certainly, this kind of argumentation plays some role in Hegel’s defense of labor in civil 
society. However, we ought to set aside the systematic response for reasons of consistency and 
charity. First and most significantly, if Hegel really thought larger societal structures were 
sufficient for the defense of abstract labor, then he would have had no need for mobilizing the 
solution of machine automation in the first place. Hegel’s insistence across all his political 
writings on the replacement of living labor with machines as the solution to the problem of 
abstract labor makes it unlikely that he thought such a systematic response was sufficient in this 
case. Second, we may doubt the success of Hegel’s systematic responses in general, particularly 
as he employs them in defense of the necessity of social ills (e.g., poverty, the rabble, 
unemployment, or war). In the case of Abstumpfung, such a response is even self-defeating, as 
the very educational processes of abstract labor foreclose the possibility of taking up this wider 
perspective. Thus, if Hegel’s solution to the problems of abstract labor relies primarily on such 
systematicity, then, for most contemporary readers, it is unlikely to succeed.  
 We may also wonder whether Hegel’s purposed solution of replacing abstract labor with 
machines is inconsistent with the fundamental role he gives labor in forming ethical subjectivity, 
Bildung. As labor is replaced by machines, the educational opportunities available through labor 
are, it seems, diminished in equal degree. However, this inconsistency hinges on interpreting 
Hegel as claiming that all labor in civil society cultivates well-formed subjectivity. In fact, and 
as we have seen, Hegel’s underlying claim is simply that this is not true; not all labor cultivates 
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well-formed subjectivity, even in labor’s rational reconstruction in thought. Through his concept 
of practical Bildung, Hegel has instead developed a loose set of criteria for identifying which 
kinds of labor fulfill the ethical promises of civil society. While these criteria are admittedly 
constructed partly out of his conception of ethical and free human living that finds its articulation 
throughout the entirety of the Philosophy of Spirit, they are also in many ways immanent to the 
principles of civil society and the system of needs themselves.  
 The kind of subject-formation brought about by abstract labor is, in fact, opposed to the 
kind of particularizing practical education Hegel’s sees as the proper outcome for labor. Hegelian 
Bildung aims to generate the kind of “subjectivity” that “must be developed as a living whole” 
(PR §260A), meaning that each social position the subject occupies—mother, worker, consumer, 
citizen, daughter, property-owner, student, and so on—contributes to the ethical, ‘truly human’ 
formation of the subject as a whole. The normative and ethical role allotted to labor in civil 
society is to ensure that this “subjectivity is educated in its particularity” (PR §187), which the 
subject accomplishes through her actualization of her self-conception as a worker involved in a 
meaningful and socially productive labor process, a process in which the subject’s required 
specialization does not prohibit her wider awareness of the rationality of the whole. So 
understood, Hegel is just correctly applying his own set of ethical criteria when he celebrates the 
inevitable replacement of spiritless, anti-ethical abstract labor with machines, as this opens up 
the possibility for these laborers to take part in the kinds of labor Hegel thinks ethically 
appropriate for all citizens of a modern state.   
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